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Abstract 
There is a common misconception among those who are not scholars in the field that 
the Assyrian Empire was an aggressive one, relying simply on force, rather than 
reason, to assert its will over its neighbours and conquer vast territories. Granted that 
the Assyrian war machine was unparalleled at its apex, its rulers did not hesitate to 
use oaths, treaties and pacts wherever possible. Assyrian foreign policy was complex 
and aided Assyrian kings in conquering vast territories, not only with force, but also 
with words and the threat of force. In the matter of imperial administration, however, 
there appear variations in the policies aimed at the western states of Assyria's empire, 
and the policy directed at Babylon. 
This dissertation aims to cast light upon those differences, and offer answers to 
questions that surface. Administration of conquered lands takes into account cultural 
and lingual proximity, as well as religious ideology. Another aim is to present the 
differences in Assyrian imperial administration under the kings Esarhaddon and 
Assurbanipal, and explores answers as to why these differences arise, as well as 
exploring whether foreign or civil policy was used. It also aims to encourage the 
notion that Assyria was not just a ruthless military power, but also an early empire 
willing to apply different methods to the creation, and administration, of its empire. 
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A Note on the Text 
The spelling may vary throughout the text depending on circumstances. The 
difference between Babylon and Babylonia is the first term is used when referring to 
the city, and the second term when referring to the kingdom. Assur will refer to the 
city, whilst Assur will refer to the deity. Assurbanipal shall be written as such, unless 
directly quoted from another text, in which case no changes will be made to the 
spelling, as will Samas-sumu-ukin. The same can be said for all variations of spelling 
that arise out of a direct quote from another author. 
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Introduction 
-Wlien the gods cn~ated mankind 
They gave them death 
But endless life they kept for themselves-
10 
-(From the Epic of Gilgmnesh, ca. 1700 BCE), 
In his groundbreaking work on Mesopotami~ Leo Oppenheim wrote on the early rise 
of civilization: 
Early in the fourth millennium B. C. there occurred in southwest Asia a 
phenomenon of lasting importance for the history of the world: the appearance 
in quick succession of a group of culture foci. Among them were those which 
were eventually to give rise to the self-contained and characteristic civilizations 
which we may identify by the names of the river valley that harboured them: the 
civilizations of the Indus Valley, Euphrates Valley, and Nile Valley.1 
It is the civilization that arose in the Euphrates Valley that concerns us. This research 
aims at illustrating several important features of the construction and maintenance of 
empire, and to demonstrate the differing approaches taken by Assyria in its imperial 
administration. The time period under scrutiny is that when Assyria was at the height 
of its power, the years between 680 and 627 BCE, under the kingships of Esarhaddon 
and his successor, Assurbanipal. Under these two great kings, the realms of the 
Assyrian empire included Egypt, the Levant, Southern Anatolia, Urartu, Elam and 
Arabia.2 Much of the Ancient Near East was at some point under the sway of Assyria, 
and its world system was far larger than its imperial borders, 'extending from beyond 
the Straights of Gibraltar to Afghanistan' .3 
Assyria was able to achieve such a vast and powerful emp1re through shrewd 
administration, military prowess, and political and diplomatic planning. It is to its 
credit that Assyria was able to field such massive armies with capable generals at the 
1 Leo Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait of a Dead Civilization. (Chicago, 1977), pp. 31. 
2 See Map 1 (Appendix 1 ). 
3 Mitchell Allen (2005), "Power is in the Details: Administrative Technology and the growth of 
Ancient Near Eastern Cores'.'- in- Christopher Chase-Dunn and Eugene N. Anderson, The Historical 
Evolution of World-Systems. (New York, 2005), pp. 75. 
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helm and an army of bureaucrats ready to solve logistical and management problems 
through innovation and adaptation. 
Contrary to a popular notion still widely sustained today, Assyria was not an empire 
solely built and maintained via force. The belligerent nature of the Assyrian state 
ideology and kingship is well known and no doubt accounts for many of its successes 
as an empire, yet Assyria was able to resort to diplomacy to expand and consolidate. 
As much as it relied on force, the threat of force was in many cases enough to 
convince unwilling states to submit to its overlordship. Pacts, treaties and loyalty 
oaths played an important part in establishing an Assyrian hegemony in the Ancient 
Near East. Notwithstanding the fact that the Assyrian empire has been immortalized 
in history as a pitiless and belligerent power, and that its primary means of expansion 
was by warfare, the 'expansion of Assyria took place less dramatically, almost 
imperceptibly, through political deals with foreign rulers (or would be rulers) seeking 
military aid, peace or favours from the Assyrian king' .4 
This study will concentrate on the reigns of two Assyrian kings, that of Esarhaddon 
(680-669 BCE) and Assurbanipal (668-627 BCE)5• The reigns of these two kings 
have been chosen because the information relating to their rules is abundant, and they 
were the kings of Assyria at a time when it was at its apex. To be able to successfully 
prove that differences in foreign policy existed, several key issues will be addressed 
throughout the respective chapters. Assyrian reactions to certain events in its Western 
provinces a.Jld peripheries will be gauged, as will actions undertaken in the kingdom 
of Babylonia. 
Such studies will reveal differing Assyrian strategies for dealing with matters 
regarding the administration of an empire. Another issue to be dealt with is the need 
to understand why this was so. If contrasting policies did exist, why is it that 
Babylonia was treated differently to states in Anatolia, the Levant and Egypt? The 
4 Simo Parpola and Kazuko Watanabe, Neo-Assyrian Treaties and Loyalty Oaths. (Helsinki, 1988), pp. 
XXIII). - *This collection of treaties, pacts and loyalty oaths will form one of the several pillars upon 
which this study is based. 
5 
The chronology used for d~ting is that of Jack Sasson's four volume series on the Ancient Near East, 
discussed in greater detail under the subheading dealing with difficulties and sources. 
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answers to these questions will be found through an investigation of cultural, religious 
and military factors. 
Chapter Structure 
Chapter 1 will set the background as to the rise of the Assyrian empire up to 680 
BCE. It will deal with developments in the Assyrian heartland, as well as with large 
portions of the Ancient Near East. The Middle Assyrian kingdom and rise of the 
Assyrian empire at the turn of the First Millennium will be covered in this section. 
Assyrian dependence on Babylonian culture and religious ideology will be remarked 
on, with greater emphasis placed upon it in Chapter 3. The fall of the Amarna Age 
and the commencement of the Third Intermediate period in Egypt will be looked at as 
one of the factors leading to the rise of Assyria. The fall of the Hittites and Mitanni 
are of important nature as it was not until then that Assyria was able to assert itself as 
an imperial power. Chapter 1 concludes with the end of Sennacherib and the 
beginning ofEsarhaddon's reign. 
Chapter 2 concentrates on the nature of Assyrian policy towards its Western 
neighbours, provinces and vassals. Specific examples highlight the level of Assyrian 
imperial control in the Levant and Egypt and what were the hallmarks of this policy. 
Parpola and Watanabe's (1988) collation of treaties and loyalty oaths will provide 
very important first hand information into the international workings of the Assyrian 
empire under Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal, as will Luckenbill's (1927) collection of 
Assyrian and Babylonian records. 
The character of Assyrian imperial administration is examined separately under the 
two different kings, and then compared so as to establish continuity, or not, in 
imperial management. The Levantine states (Judah, Israel and Phoenicia, to name a 
few) and Egypt will form the prime examples of Assyrian decision making in the 
region. Steven Holloway's research into this area will be a rich source for 
investigation; particularly his book Assur is King! Assur is King! Religion in the 
Exercise of Power in the Neo-Assyrian Empire. (Leiden 2002). 
Chapter 3 is aimed at asserting the disposition of Assyrian conduct towards 
Babylonia. It discusses why after Sennacherib's destruction of Babylon his successor, 
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Esarhaddon, endeavours to rebuild Babylon, and undo the workings of his 
predecessor. It explains how his motives highlight the variation in Assyrian policy 
when dealing with Babylonia and draws attention to his effort at solving the 
'perennial Babylonian problem'6 by installing two sons on the thrones of Assyria and 
Babylonia. This chapter also demonstrates that there is no other documented case of 
an Assyrian approach to imperial administration by using a member of the royal 
family in the position of administrator of a province or vassal state, and how 
Assurbanipal continues his father's policy of appeasement in Babylonia. 
Assurbanipal's re-construction of Babylon, a continuation of his father's plan, 
contrasts violently with the sacking of Thebes by his troops. Finally it deals with the 
Babylonian led insurgency against Assyria that eventually lead Assurbanipal to 
destroy Babylon after four years of 'civil war' .7 
Chapter 4 is a comparison in administrative policies between Babylonia and the West 
under Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal from 680 to 627 BCE. It also aims to provide an 
explanation for the difference in administration policies. It underlines why cultural 
and religious continuity is a key factor in the relationship between Assyria and 
Babylonia, and how the Assyrian kings embark on an ambitious re-building plan to 
restore Babylon as a political manoeuvre to reverse the damage done by Sennacherib. 
A short conclusion ends this study. 
Sources and Difficulties 
A culture l<mg buried under the sands of the ·Middle East is always a challenge to 
properly investigate and research. Assyriology has been around for well over a 
century, and it is predominantly concerned with the study of Assyrian history, culture, 
religion and language, relying both on monumental archaeological remains and 
extensive textual information. 8 There are a variety of sources, both primary and 
secondary, to turn to. 
6 Oppenheim (1977). Op Cit, pp. 169. 
7 Ibid. -The use of the term 'civil war' is interesting since the use of 'civil' to describe the war implies a 
closer relationship between Assyria and Babylon, to the extent that Babylon is considered an important 
part of the Assyrian world-system core. It deserves further scrutiny in Chapter 3. 
8 Jean Bottero, Mesopotamia: Writing, Reasoning and the Gods. (Chicago, 1992), pp. 41-42. Textual 
information can mean tablets and seals found within a palace or residence, or palace and wall reliefs, 
which are usually, painted depictions of life and the gods in Assyria. 
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Out of the most important of the primary sources is the State Archives of Assyria 
(SAA) series, a collection of textual evidence taken from Assyrian inscriptions, palace 
wall reliefs and imperial correspondence, 9 the SAA volume II, Neo-Assyrian Treaties 
and Loyalty Oaths (1988) by Parpola and Watanabe proves to be the most 
fundamental. Daniel D. Luckenbill's collation of textual evidence from the Ancient 
Near East in Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia (1927) is just as important, as 
is Kirk Grayson's Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles (2000). 
Secondary evidence comes in the form of several works by authors well known within 
the field of Assyriology, and the Ancient Near East in general. Jack Sasson's four-
volume compilation of essays and research about Ancient Near East is the standard 
work used to deal with chronology to understand dates that can seem so disparate 
from researcher to researcher. Amelie Kuhrt and Marc van de Mieroop both have 
books extensively covering the history and development of the Ancient Near Eastern, 
making available a wealth of information on Assyria at the turn of the First 
Millennium. Likewise, the collection of essays that comprises A Companion to the 
Ancient Near East10 provides several reference points towards the world that Assyria 
was a part of. 
Special mention must be made to three authors in particular. Leo Oppenheim, Grant 
Frame, and Steven Holloway. Frame's book on the relationship between Assyrian and 
Babylonia during the years 689 to 627 BCE is indispensable to this study, as is 
Holloway's investigation into the Assyrian ·imperial machine, and the religious 
convictions that drove it. Leo Oppenheim's book on Mesopotamia is the core 
secondary reference, and one of the most seminal sources when dealing with all 
aspects of Mesopotamian history. 
With any historical study, the disappearance of vital records and monumental 
structures over time presents a constant challenge, as happened when the Assyrian 
empire fell after Assurbanipal' s death in 627 BCE. It is after the quelling of the 
9 The State Archive of Assyria series is a compilation ofNeo-Assyrian texts, mainly those found in the 
Nineveh royal palaces, and organized by genre. Funded and organized by the University of Helsinki, 
most of the textual information comes from tablets and inscriptions uncovered by archaeology during 
the early years of Assyriology. The texts are presented in both the transliterated and English translation 
forms.- http://www.helsink~.fi/science/saa/saa.html 
10 Daniel Snell (Ed.)~ A Companion to the Ancient Near East, (Oxford 2005). 
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Babylonian rebellion by Assurbanipal that Assyrian accounts become uncommon. 
yet, substantial information remains for the time period 680-640 BCE as to the 
machinations ofthe Assyrian empire. This abundance of information yields, however, 
another problem, namely the large number of documents yet to be translated and 
collated. Chronology is another issue that arises in the field of Assyriology. When a 
new find or translation sheds new evidence on a certain topic dates can change. In 
many cases they do depending on the interpretation of certain authors and scholars. 
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Chapter 1 
The Rise of Assyria 
You are sworn by Assur, J(ing of heaven and earth/ 1 
Chapter One establishes the context for this research topic. The two reigns under 
scrutiny, that of Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal, were the last reigns of a glorious 
empire. The two kings that ruled from 680 to 627 BCE owed much to the work 
undertaken by their predecessors, and it is necessary to present a general history of the 
region, in order to better understand this era. Establishing the background allows the 
reader to identify the historical, social, cultural and religious context of the period. 
More importantly, it helps to understand the Assyrian structure of imperial 
administration by the time Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal come to power. 
Rise of Nations 
The history of civilization in the Ancient Near East began approximately 9000 years 
before the Christian era when "the world's earliest known civilizations arose and 
matured" .12 The geographical area of what is termed the Ancient Near East comprises 
south-western Asia and Egypt13• It effectively groups together the region 
encompassed by the contemporary states of Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, 
Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Iraq, Iran, and parts of Saudi Arabia.14 
In the Anqient Near East, primarily in Mesopotamia, the domestication of crops 
enabled man to inhabit a strip of fertile land, and live off it for generations, thus 
establishing a permanent living community: 
'The greater productivity per household that was possible if families 
collaborated in sowing and harvesting provided an incentive for the emergence 
of sedentary hamlets and villages.' 15 
u SAA 2:6. Parpola and Watanabe (1988). 
12 Bernard Knapp, The History and Culture of Ancient Western Asia and Egypt. (California, 1988), pp. 
11. . 
13 See Map 2 (Appendix 1 ). 
14 Knapp (1988). Op Cit, pp. 11. 
15 Fekri A. Hassan (1995) "Egypt in the Prehistory of Northeast Africa", in Jack M. Sasson, 
Civilizations of the Ancient Near East. Volume 2, (New York, 1995), pp. 672. 
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New farming techniques enabled farmers to become less dependent on 'dry farming 
zones', and agriculture was able to advance based on new irrigation techniques.16 It 
would not be long before powerful city states arose, and with this growth, the 
development of an early style of inter-kingdom relations. As the influence of certain 
kingdoms grew larger, and trade between these kingdoms increased on an ever-larger 
scale, a system of relations was formed. 
The advent of trade through surplus production led to an inevitable need to create a 
policy dealing with foreign kingdoms so as to better take advantage of economic 
dealings. The practice of diplomacy would have built upon existing trade routes and 
the knowledge of foreign customs. In most cases it 'seems that the economic horizon 
stretched beyond the limits of diplomacy', 17 paving the way for the development of 
relations between states. For a trader to successfully sell their ware in a foreign state, 
they would have had to know the rudimentary customs of their clients. As early as 
1800 BCE, during the reign of Shamshi-Adad I, there is evidence of the existence of 
diplomatic relations between two kingdoms, building upon previously established 
trade relations and routes.18 However, for the next four centuries, due to an inability to 
successfully compete against its ·neighbours, Assyrian history would enter a 'dark 
ages' .19 
The Middle Assyrian period (ca. 1400-1100 BCEi0 provides a glimpse into the state 
that was to become the most powerful on earth. The Assyrian kings demonstrated 
from early pn Assyria's dependence on a simplistic style of diplomacy. The particular 
case of Ashur-nadin-ahhe I (ca. 1440 BCE), who is known to have engaged in 
16 William W. Rallo and William K. Simpson, The Ancient Near East: A History. (Fort Worth, 1998), 
pp.26. 
17 Martin Wight, Systems ofStates, (Leicester, 1977), pp. 33. 
18 Jesper Eidem and Flemming Hojlund, 'Trade or Diplomacy? Assyria in the Eighteenth Century BC', 
in World Archaeology, Vol. 24, No 3, Ancient Trade: New Perspectives, (Feb, 1993), pp. 441-448. 
Assyrian trade with Dilmun is well known, but certain evidence shows that it may be more complex 
than that. This article deals with the translation of the word harr ii num, and that it may have been 
diplomacy, not trade, propelling relations between the two kingdoms. 
19 Refer to Oppenheim (1977), pp. 164-166, for a general discussion on the topic of the Assyrian dark 
ages, and the brief rise of Assyria in the late Second Millennium, the Middle Assyrian Period, when 
Assyria was freed from Mitanni overlordship. 
20 Amelie Kuhrt, The Ancient Near East: c. 3000-330 BC, Volumes I-II, (London, 1995), pp. 348. The 
land held by the A~syriah during the middle period are the traditional lands referred to by the Neo-
Assyrian kings during the Neo-Assyrian resurgence. 
18 
diplomatic approaches to the Egyptian king Tuthmosis III, stands out.21 The first king 
of the Middle Period, Ashur-Uballit (ca. 1365-1330 BCE)22 would have learnt from 
his predecessor that it was wise to engage in diplomatic practice. Once freedom from 
the Mitanni had been assured, Ashur-Uballit claimed the Assyrian throne under the 
title of "Great King", and began direct diplomatic contact with the Egyptian court, 
undermining the Babylonians.23 
This period would also leave behind the foundations upon which Assyrian foreign 
policy would build during the ninth century resurgence. From this period onwards we 
get Assyrian annexation of territories undertaken in three steps. Firstly, the political 
subjugation of a state brought about through the threat of force, or military 
manoeuvres?4 The second step, a favourite of the Neo-Assyrian kings, was the 
imposition of non-aggression treaties, usually resigning the non-Assyrian party to 
'eternal vassalage' ?5 The third step was the complete domination of a territory, 
normally supplemented with deportations and harsh military action.26 
Age of Empires 
By the end of the Second Millennium, the Middle Assyrian period had finished, and 
the Assyrian kingdoms were dependent on other regional powers. It was not until the 
turn of the First Millennium that the world's first large empire began to take shape. 
Stephen Howe describes an empire as a 'large, composite, multi-ethnic or 
multinational political unit, usually created by conquest, and divided between a 
dominant c~ntre and subordinate, sometimes far distant, peripheries' .27 The fact that 
the world had yet to see a large, fully functional empire was soon to be changed by a 
series of aggressive Assyrian kings. 
21 Ibid, pp. 348-349. 
22 Ibid. 
23 John A. Brinkman (1972), 'Foreign Relations of Babylonia from 1600 to 625 B. C.: The 
Documentary Evidence', inAJA 76, No.3 (July 1972), pp. 276. 
24 Simo Parpola (1987), 'Neo-Assyrian Treaties from the Royal Archives of Nineveh', in JCS 39 
(August 1987), pp. 1 (footnote 3). 
25 Ibid. . 
26 Ibid. 
27 Stephen Howe, Empire. A Very Short Introduction, (New York, 2002), pp. 30. Intent is an important 
part of this definition. Imperialistic aims must exist and be justified in order to create an empire. This 
term will suit for the purposes of this research. 
19 
The Amarna age of inter-kingdom relations characterizes the last few centuries of the 
Second Millennium.28 Amenhotep III, great Pharaoh of Egypt, and his successor, 
Akhenaten, pursued diplomatic interaction with the other members of the Great 
Powers Club of the age.29 Assyria was quick to catch on to this practice of diplomatic 
relations. The Amarna period was based on the arrangement that several great powers, 
roughly equal in strength, were able to limit each other's power. These great 
kingdoms of the Ancient World were induced out of common benefit into diplomatic 
relations. 
The age of inter-kingdom diplomacy served to weaken several states, allowing 
Assyria to expand and consolidate in Mesopotamia. From Akhenaten onwards, 
Assyria became a major player on the international scene as it became accepted as a 
member of the Great Powers Club, enjoying the endorsement of its actions in 
Mesopotamia by none other than Egypt.30 By receiving Assyrian embassies, 
exchanging gifts, and entering into diplomatic relations with the Mesopotamian 
kingdom, Egypt was effectively condoning Assyrian expansionist policy.31 The main 
obstacle for Assyria's ambitions during the Amarna Age was the kingdom of Mitanni, 
of which Assyria was dependent. As master diplomats, the Hittites were able to crush 
the kingdom of Mitanni, without jeopardising the unity of the Great Powers Club, in a 
series of lightning campaigns, sweeping aside their forces, and destroying Mitannian 
power in the region. 32 
The destruction of the Mitanni serves·· to highlight an overall weakness in the 
enforcement of actions that would protect those members of the Great Powers Club: 
the great distance between Egypt and Mesopotamia, where the Assyrian, Babylonian 
and Mitanni kingdoms were located. Rather than marching an Egyptian army over a 
28 The Amarna Age started during the reign of Amenhotep III, ca. 1350 BCE, and lasted for over 200 
years thereafter. Chronology taken from Sasson (Ed.), Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, 4 
Volumes, (New York, 1995). 
29 The club comprised Egypt, Mitanni, the Hittites, Babylon and Assyria. For further information on the 
subject refer to Mario Liverani, "The Great Powers Club", in Raymond Cohen and Raymond 
Westbrook, Amarna Diplomacy, (Baltimore, 2000). 
30 An example of such endorsement can be found in EA 15 in William Moran, The Amarna Letters, 
(Baltimore, 1992), when Egypt accepts Assyria as a member of the Great Powers Club. The acceptance 
came in the form of receiving Assyrian delegations, and the exchanges of gifts giving between Pharaoh 
and Assyrian king. 
31 EA 15. 
32 Trevor Bryce, The Kingd~m of the Hittites, (New York, 2005), pp. 161. 
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great distance, negotiating with the victorious parties was the easiest and most 
effective solution to the issue. Whilst the Hittites were a new power to be reckoned 
with from ca. 1350 onwards,33 it was the Assyrians who had most to gain from this 
action. With this liberation from Mitanni dependence, Assyria was free to compete 
with the other powers of the Amarna Age, and enter a formative period in which, for 
the next few centuries, the Assyrian concept of foreign policy would be developed. 34 
Circa 1274 BCE, the armies of Egypt and Hattusa clashed near a city on the Orontes 
River in modern day Syria. After the battle it was the Hittites who remained in 
possession of this strategic military outpost on the borders of these two great 
kingdoms.35 With the Egyptians no longer exerting great influence in the Northern 
Levant and Mesopotamia and suffering a decline in revenue income from its 
dependencies, 36 the Hittites and Assyrians became powers in themselves. The two 
combined forces to route and vanquish what was left of the kingdom of Mitanni, and 
in turn, Assyria undermined the Hittites by occupying and administering the lands 
formerly held by Mitanni.37 
A shadow fell upon those states that bordered the Mediterranean at the turn of the 
First Millennium. The archaeological and textual information available to historians 
today, dating back to the 13th and 12th centuries BCE, shows that a major catastrophe 
affected the Levant, Egypt, Anatolia and the Mediterranean. A series of large-scale 
crop failures in the Mediterranean peripheries triggered human migrations on a 
massive sc~le throughout Anatolia and the Levant.38 This large migration of people, 
who often attacked the territories they moved into, precipitated the end of the Hittite 
kingdoms. Although they received grain imports from the Egyptians,39 the added 
33 Ibid. 
34 Oppenheim (1977), Op Cit, pp. 165. 
35 Ian Shaw, The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt, (New York, 2002), pp. 297-298. 
36 John Taylor, "The Third Intermediate Period" (1069-664 BC), (2002), in Shaw (2002), Op Cit, pp. 
331. 
37 David Warburton, Egypt and the Near East: Politics in the Bronze Age, (Neuchatel, 2001), pp. 212 
38 Shaw (2002), Op Cit, pp. 328. 
39 These early empires of the world system were in fact agrarian empires, highly dependent on 
successful crop yields. Crpp failures would produce famine and irreparable economic damage, 
hastening the end of any ancient empire/kingdom/state. 
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strain caused by such an influx of peoples was too much of a burden for the 
k. d 40 mg om. 
This is not to say Assyria escaped tmscathed from this disaster toward the end of the 
Bronze Age. However, over three centuries, the Assyrians were able to recover faster 
than any other state of the Ancient Near East and Egypt. When all the other states in 
the Near East and Mediterranean peripheries were staggering from the m~or 
economic and demographic change that accompanied the transition to the Iron Age 
(ca. 1 000 BCE), the most remarkable detail about Assyria during this period in the 
ninth century is the vigour with which it is able to recuperate itself.41 
The Assyrian Monolith 
The beginning of the First Millennium saw a series of belligerent Assyrian kings 
taking to the throne, and the centre of po"\Ver of the ancient world shift away from 
Egypt to Mesopotamia. The Assyrian resurgence in the ninth century began with 
Ashurnasirpal ca. 930 BCE, and continued with the warrior king Adad-Nirari II (ca. 
911-891 BCE).42 The peak of the first Neo-Assyrian revival was achieved under the 
reigns of Ashumasirpal II (883-859 BCE) and Shalmaneser III (859-824 BCE).43 
Whilst the rule of Ashumasirpal II marks the continuity, and conclusion, of Assyria in 
the long process of recovering its historical lands4\ Shalmaneser III is the first 
Assyrian king to begin an entirely new process; the conquest of lands outside 
Assyria's traditional borders.45 
The ability of these new Assyrian kings to seemingly recruit large numbers of native 
troops to undertake military campaigns, accompanied by a new program of 
recolonization,46 appears to have reversed the demographic damage caused by the 
40 Bryce (2005), Op Cit, pp. 331-334. 
41 Paul-Alain Beaulieu (2005), "World Hegemony, 900-300 BCE", in Snell (Ed.) A Companion to the 
Ancient Near East, (Malden, 2005), pp. 49. 
42 Bryce (2005), Op Cit, pp. 347. 
43 Mario Liverani (2004), "Assyria in the Ninth Century: Continuity or Change?", in Frame, Grant 
(Ed.), From the Upper to the Lower Sea: Studies on the History of Assyria and Babylonia in Honour of 
A.K Grayson, (Leiden, 2004), pp. 213. 
44 Those under Assyrian control after the largest expansion during Middle Assyrian period. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Reco Ionization would come in the form of resettling Assyrian natives in other parts of the kingdom 
peacefully, or, later on, forcefully deporting and resettling natives of conquered lands. 
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migrations that marked the end of the Bronze Age.47 These same kings were also able 
to learn from the predecessors, and institute an aggressive foreign policy that suited 
their imperialistic aims. The next two hundred years of Assyrian history fluctuate 
greatly. It was not until the mid-eighth century that the Assyrian empire began to take 
the shape of the monolith it would become a century later. The Assyrian king Tiglath-
Pileser III (745-727 BCE) is considered to be the founder ofthe true Assyrian empire. 
Tiglath-Pileser III was the first to do away with the large provinces and provincial 
power cores. He did so by splitting the provinces into smaller entities, consequently 
limiting the power base of the provincial governors. By doing this he developed the 
provincial system westward of the Euphrates, creating a large number of new 
provinces and vassal states. 
By abolishing the old border between the land of Assur and the client kingdoms 
of the west, Tiglath-Pileser in fact inaugurated the true imperial phase of 
Assyria.48 
Though it is known that Tiglath-Pileser III was succeeded by his son Shalmaneser V 
(726-722 BCE), details concerning his reign are obscure.49 It is unclear whether his 
successor, Sargon II, was an outsider who usurped the throne, or another of Tiglath-
Pileser's sons. What is beyond doubt, however, is that Sargon II (721-705 BCE)50 
initiated the most successful period in Assyrian history, and the largest empire 
building experiment the world had yet seen. 
Assyria was able to maintain such a large empire by adopting many different, and 
highly successful, tactics and techniques. They were the first to maintain a year-round 
standing army. The creation of a professional officer class dedicated to military affairs 
gave the Assyrians an undeniable advantage on the field of battle. Secondly they were 
easy to assimilate new technologies from their peripheral provinces and vassal 
states. 51 The end of the Bronze Age and the fall of the Hittite kingdom meant that 
many skilled labourers, fluent in the Hittite art of metal work, were absorbed into the 
47 Beaulieu (2005), Op Cit, pp.49. 
48 Liverani (2004), Op Cit, pp. 53. 
49 George Roux, Ancient Iraq, New Edition, (London, 1992), pp. 310. 
50 Ibid. 
51 ' ' Allen (2005), Op Cit. 
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Assyrian empire, and their skills put to work designing new weaponry for the 
Assyrian armies. New administrative technologies were put in place, including the use 
of Aramaic as a lingua franca, standardized weight systems and effective taxation 
52 
management. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, was the manipulation of the local elite. For far 
away provinces it was easier for Assyria to support the ruling elite already in place, 
given that they were willing to submit to Assyrian overlordship. It effectively meant 
that the ruling elite were able to maintain their status as long as they were willing to 
pay taxes, and provide for Assyrian armies should they be campaigning in the region. 
The relationship was usually enforced by a treaty or loyalty oath, sometimes preceded 
by the sacking and destruction of a city as a show of force, as testified by the textual 
records left behind by the Assyrian kings themselves. 
The Sargonid kings conquered all who opposed them and under their command the 
Assyrian empire stretched from Elam in the east to Egypt in the west, from Babylonia 
in the south to Carcemish in Anatolia in the north. Their world empire system 
extended as far Spain and encompassed much of the Mediterranean.53 Sargon and his 
successor Sennacherib (704-681 BCE)54 campaigned all the way up to the gates of 
Egypt and quashed countless rebellions within the provinces that made up the 
Assyrian empire. 
The Peopl~ of Assur 
To understand the justification for imperial construction as undertaken by the 
Assyrian state, it is necessary to have a basic comprehension of the religious ideology 
driving the Assyrian people. Whilst in Egypt the pharaohs were seen as an incarnation 
of the deity, the Assyrian kings embodied what their pantheon of gods stood for. The 
Assyrian king was the high priest of Assur on earth, a mortal representative of the 
gods; 'The Neo-Assyrian royal titularies ... hammer away at the theme of the unique 
52 Ibid 
53 Mario Liverani (2001), "The Fall of the Assyrian Empire: Ancient and Modem Interpretations", in 
~usan Alcock & Terrance D' Altroy, eta/ (Ed.), Empires, (Cambridge, 2001). 
Roux (1992), Op Cit. 
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proximity ofthe king to the divine realm and extol his god-like powers.'55 Though not 
viewed as a deity, the Assyrian king was expected to enact the cosmic order in the 
earthly realm, much like the Pharaoh in Egyptian ideology. 
The Assyrian gods were the supreme rulers of their divine universe, and the Assyrian 
kings were the supreme rulers on Earth; thus resigning themselves to the cosmic 
order: 
Intrinsic to the Assyrian perception of history was the notion of the god's 
absolute universal authority, a theology with theocratic significance: the gods 
are directly involved in the relations of states whose fate they also determine. 
They supervise international affairs as well as direct all human matters. War and 
peace are at the discretion of the gods. 56 
The Assyrians were quite tolerant of the religions of other cultures and they did not 
seek to impose their own religious views over those they conquered. They used their 
ideology to justify their actions in the field. If the Assyrian gods were masters in the 
heavens, then on earth, the Assyrians were to be masters of the four corners of the 
world. It was as the gods intended. In reverence of their chief deity Assur, they called 
themselves subjects of Assur, and their empire, the land of Assur. They wrote the 
names of 'Assyria, the city of Assur, and the national god Assur all as Assur, which 
clearly marks the native understanding of the land as the extension of the city and 
god'.57 
It is the provinces that constitute Assyria proper, 'if you are in Assyria, you are in a 
province' .58 There was a much larger degree of internal management by the Assyrian 
ruler within the provinces. Governors were appointed by the Assyrian king, usually 
from one of the old ruling families of Assur, not the local ruling elite. 59 Since a 
55 Steven W. Holloway, Assur is King! Assur is King! Religion in the Exercise of Power in the Neo-
Assyrian Empire, (Leiden, 2002), pp. 81. 
56 Bustenay Oded, Justifications for War in Assyrian Royal Inscriptions, (Wiesbaden, 1992), pp. 11. 
57 Peter Machinist, "Assyrians on Assyria in the First Millennium B.C.", in Kurt Raaflaub and 
Elizabeth Mtiller-Luckner, Anfange Politischen Denkens in der Antike: Die NahOstlichen Kulturen und 
die Griechen, (Mtinchen, 1993), pp. 81. 
58 John N. Postgate (1992), 'The Land of Assur and the Yoke of Assur', in World Archaeology, Vol. 
23, No 3, Archaeology of Empires, (Feb, 1992), pp. 252. 
59 Ibid. . 
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province was part of the internal structure of the empire, it was administered as such. 
Territories freshly added as provinces were said to have been returned to Assyria, 
'reflecting the ideological centr~lity of the city of Assur, and the city-god' .60 
Assyrian Foreign affairs 
Today's conventions on international relations, diplomacy and foreign affairs have 
made these fields complicated, and they do little to describe the situation present 
centuries before the Christian era began. The diplomatic system of the Ancient Near 
East during this period was a simple one. The great kings communicated with each 
other, cemented pacts and treaties with gifts of precious items, marriages and non-
aggression pledges. Foreign policy was determined based on the wants of each king, 
and the ideological relationship between these kingdoms. The style of diplomacy 
practiced was crude, but it was 'able to achieve results. Intentions were conveyed; 
information was gathered; and negotiations successfully concluded. '61 
Another issue to be raised is the use of the term 'international relations' when dealing 
with the pre-modern world. The notion of nation states is a new one, something that 
arises out of 181h and 191h Century Europe. The term 'international affairs' implies 
relations between nation states, not ancient empires. However, the term foreign affairs 
can be applied. Those kingdoms found in the Levant or Egypt were very different 
from those found in Assyria or Babylonia, in fact they were quite 'foreign' in several 
aspects, be it culture, social structure, ideology and architecture, just to name a few 
instances. When referring to the term 'foreign. policy', it should be remembered that 
the modern day rules and laws do not apply. In the ancient world it referred to the 
policy adopted for dealing with foreign kingdoms and city-states on all levels, be it 
economic, martial, or religious. Foreign policy was justified through religious beliefs; 
the Assyrian kings were carrying out instructions on behalf of their gods. 62 
Shortly before Sargon II took over as Assyrian king, two events of considerable 
importance occurred which would affect Assyrian strategy and diplomacy for the next 
60 Ibid, pp. 251. 
61 Geoffrey Berridge, 'Amarna Diplomacy: A Full Fledged Diplomatic System?, in Cohen and 
Westbrook (2000), Op Cit. 
62 ARAB VII: IV. Text from the Zinjirli Stele. A great example of Esarhaddon justifying his actions, 
through religious ideology, in Egypt as a direct result of the Pharaoh Tirhaqa ignoring the established 
cosmic order, and rebelling not against the king of Assyria, but rather the Assyrian gods. 
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century, 'the interference of Egypt in Palestine and of Elam in Babylonia' .63 It was 
Tiglath-Pileser's meddling in the Levant that brought about the hostilities between 
Egypt and Assyria. It meant that until the fall of the Assyrian empire, the Assyrian 
kings had to contend with a hostile Egypt, forever interfering in the Levant, greatly 
influencing Assyrian imperial policy in the region. 
It is important to note the importance of the effect that Assyrian religion had upon 
imperial expansion and administration. The proximity in culture, religious beliefs, and 
to an extent the pantheon of deities of Assyria and Babylonia, affected the way 
Assyria would deal with Babylonia during the years 680-627 BCE. Sharing no such 
affinity with the west meant that Assyria could comfortably justify conquest and 
plunder in the name of their chief deity, Assur. 
63 Ibid, pp. 310. 
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This is the li>eaty which &arhaddon. king of Assyria, has concluded with you, in the presence of 
the great gods of heaven and earth on behalf of Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate, · 
son of &arl1addon, king of Assyria, your k)J'd, whom he has named and appointed to the cmwn-
. h' 64 pl'lnces 1p. 
To maintain such a large empire, it is necessary to have in place an effective system 
of imperial administration. This chapter seeks to present the sort of imperial policy 
used by Assyria to control the western states that made up the empire administered by 
Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal. It will further explain Near Eastern 'foreign policy' in 
terms of the relationship between Assyria and Egypt, and analyse the use of Assyrian 
administrative policy in Egypt, Judah and Phoenicia. 
The First Millennium in the Ancient Near East presented new challenges to those 
kingdoms that had comprised the Great Powers Club. Babylonia had been weakened 
from its constant campaigning against the Hurrians and Elamites, and the Mitanni 
long deposed by the Hittites. The Hittites were in turn devastated by the famines and 
large-scale migrations that heralded the end of the Bronze Age, like many other 
kingdoms bordering the Mediterranean. Egypt had fallen into hard times, known 
historically as the Third Intermediate Period (1100-650 BCE)65, and ceased to be a 
real threat to Assyrian interests in the Levant by the time of Esarhaddon and 
Assurbanipal. 
Two Great Powers: Assyria and Egypt 
Assyria's rule of Egypt under Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal had no precedent; they 
were the only Near Eastern kings, up until then, to have ever governed over Egypt. 
Assyrian administrative policies in Egypt can be termed 'foreign policy' as Egypt lay 
well outside the land considered by Assyria to be the 'Land of Assur' .66 Further, there 
is no documented case of an Assyrian attempt to install a member of the local elite as 
64 SAA 2: 6. Parpola and Watanabe (1988). 
65 Kenneth A. Kitchen, The Third Intermediate Period in Egypt. 1100-650 BC. 2nd Revised Edition, 
(Westminster 1986). 
66 Refer to Chapter 1 concerning the people and land of Assur. 
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ruler of Egypt. There is no distinct case concerning the installation of a member of the 
Assyrian royal family in the entire western Near East. Up until the end of the reign of 
Tiglath-Pileser III (ca. 7 40-727 BCE) Assyria and Egypt had avoided entering into 
conflict with each other, largely spurred by the spirit of the Amarna period,67 and the 
great distances between the two kingdoms. It was not until Tiglath-Pileser began to 
aggressively meddle in the southern Levant that the two powers commenced a period 
of hostile relations. 68 
The year 701 BCE marked a turning point in Assyrian policy toward Egypt. In that 
year 'Sennacherib had faced an Egyptian army supporting rebels against Assyria' ,69 
and after 20 years of relatively friendly Egyptian neutrality in Palestine, 70 the 
Egyptian king, Shebitku, sent troops to fight alongside the kings of Ekron and Judah 
against Assyria.71 By the time of Esarhaddon's accession the relationship had soured 
further, and aggressive administrative policy in Syria-Levant meant that Assyria was 
to bring down its entire wrath on Egypt. 
Most of the western kingdoms had already been invaded, annexed and re-organized 
into provinces and vassal states as a result of the military and diplomatic campaigns of 
Tiglath-Pileser III and Sargon II during the Eighth century.72 Although Esarhaddon's 
invasion in 67 4 BCE was largely unsuccessful, only three years later he was able to 
mass another powerful army and invade again.73 In 671 BCE, Esarhaddon responded 
to Egyptian aggression that came as a result of 'military expansion as far as Ashkelon 
in Philistia, under Tirhaqa, the militant pharaoh of the 25th Nubian dynasty of 
Egypt' .74 Esarhaddon decided that Tirhaqa's actions in Ashkelon were not to be 
tolerated, and mobilised his armies upon receiving positive answers after querying the 
67 From Akhenaten's reign onward, Assyrian action in Mesopotamia appeared to be sanctioned by 
Egypt. EA 15 is an interesting read concerning early Assyro-Egytpian relations. 
68 Kuhrt (1995), Op Cit, pp. 499. 
69 Ibid. 
7
° Kitchen (1986), Op Cit, pp. 155. The term 'friendly' is used because the Egyptian ruler in those 20 
years, Shabako, maintained a neutral stance in Palestine as Sargon II rampaged in the region. Shabako 
even extradited a fugitive wanted by Assyria; Iamani of Ashdod. 
71 Ibid. Kitchen discusses the issues of dating the reigns of Egyptian kings during this period, pp. 150-
155. 
72 See Map 3 (Appendix 1 ). . 
73 Kitchen (1986), Op Cit, pp. 145. 
74 Hayim Tadmor, "World Dominion: The Expanding Horizon of the Assyrian Empire", (1997), in L. 
Milano, S. de Martino et al (Ed.), Landscapes. Territories, Frontiers and Horizons in the Ancient Near 
East. XLIV Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale. (Venezia 1997), pp.59. 
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gods. 75 Assyrian interests in the Levant were being threatened and Esarhaddon was 
not about to allow this. 
This time the Assyrian armies were successful. Esarhaddon defeated the Egyptian 
forces, driving them southwards, and securing, with the capture of Memphis, Assyrian 
control over Northern Egypt. Esarhaddon was unsparing in writing his own praise: 
Esarhaddon, the great king, the mighty king, king of the universe, king of 
Assyria, viceroy of Babylon, king of Sumer and Akkad, king of Karduniash 
(Babylonia), all of it (lit., them), king of the kings of Musur, Paturisu and Kusi 
(Lower Egypt, Upper Egypt and Ethiopia);'76 
The sack of Memphis was a calculated Assyrian domination ploy, an essential 
component of their foreign policy. A country guilty of sin against the Assyrian gods 
had to be made an example of. Like in modernity where military manoeuvres can be 
used to discourage a country from hostilities, in the ancient world the sacking of an 
important city made for a strong visual representation on the fate that awaited those 
who opposed Assyrian rule. Esarhaddon then proceeded to install various local 
princes as rulers, using the proven formula of utilising the local elite, so long as they 
swore loyalty to their Assyrian overlords, to manage a land far from the power core. 77 
K. A. Kitchen's study on Egypt during the Third Intermediate Period provides a 
listing on local Saite rulers in Egypt before, during and after Esarhaddon's second 
invasion. 78 
Esarhaddon felt no need to justify the actions of his armies in Egypt other than the 
standard Assyrian explanation about carrying out the gods' wishes. According to his 
own inscriptions, and the events that unfolded during his invasion of Egypt, 
Esarhaddon was only too happy to comply: 
When Assur, the great lord, in order to show to the peoples the immensity of my 
mighty deeds, extended (lit., made powerful) my kingship over the kings of the 
four regions (of the world), and made great my name ... To rob, to plunder, to 
75 SAA 4. Starr (1990). SAA 4: 81-83 directly refer to Esarhaddon inquiring as to wether he should 
march on Ashkelon. SAA 4: 84-87 recount Esarhaddon's queries regarding military action to be taken 
on the Pharaoh Tirhaqa. 
76 ARAB VII: IV: 575. Text from the Zinjirli Stele. 
77 Kitchen (1986), Op Cit, pp. 144-146. 
78 Refer to Kitchen (1986), Op Cit, chapters 9-10. 
extend the border of Assyria, they (the gods) empowered me (lit., fill my 
hands).79 
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Although Assyrian control over Northern Egypt lasted for a short time, foreign policy 
would be the functional term here. 80 Egypt was a culturally different territory on the 
very fringes of the Assyrian empire, and the Assyrian king had to rely on the loyalty 
of the local princes, secured by oaths, to maintain control over the region. 
Deportation was another favourite Assyrian policy that was employed in Egypt. It was 
common of Assyrian imperial administration to deport peoples from troublesome 
areas to other parts of the empire,81 thus accelerating assimilation. Additionally, 
bringing these peoples into the inner folds of the empire made it easier to maintain 
control over them, as well as breaking down the sentiment that one feels for their 
native land, and the problems that that may cause for a foreign invader. A letter, dated 
during the reigns of Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal, and written by the king's priests 
deals with the topic of providing grain for Kushites and Egyptians in the Assyrian city 
of Assur.82 It is possible that these were in fact deportees from Assyrian campaigns in 
the years under Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal. 
Through the diplomatic process of installing loyal princes in positions of power, and 
promising them that position as long as they maintained their loyalty to him, 
Esarhaddon was able to govern the parts of Egypt he had conquered from afar.83 The 
stark contrast between Assyrian and Egyptian culture, ideology and society 
undermined. any plans of an administration similar to that used in Babylonia. In 669 
BCE, as Esarhaddon was once again marching on Egypt to consolidate Assyrian 
suzerainty, he died en route, leaving the resolution of the Egyptian problem up to his 
successor. 84 
79 ARAB VII: IV: 579. Op Cit. 
80 Based on the idea that the foreign policy of a state/country/kingdom operates on the guidelines of 
how it must interrelate with other states/countries/kingdoms. Foreign policy is designed to protect an 
entity's interests outside its borders, including those that are ideological and economic. Very true in the 
case of the Assyrian administration of Egypt, a kingdom well outside its traditional borders. 
81 The destruction and deportation of the kingdom oflsrael is a clear example of the effectiveness, and 
devastation, ofthis policy. . 
82 LEA 13. 
83 See Kitchen's use of Manetho's chronology from Africanus to sort out local Saite rulers during the 
~ears that Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal ruled Assyria, in Kitchen (1986), Op Cit. 
Kuhrt (1995), Op Cit, pp. 499. 
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Shortly after ascending to the throne, Assurbanipal launched a campaign against 
Egypt to continue what his father had begun in 669 BCE, demonstrating his intent to 
maintain Assyria's aggressive foreign policy in the west. In 663 BCE they took and 
sacked Thebes in what was 'an event that had been totally inconceivable for over 
1500 years'.85 Like the sacking of Memphis, the destruction of Thebes would have 
been intended as a propaganda tool cautioning against rebellion. In strict continuance 
with his father's policy of ruling Egypt as a vassal state with rulers from the local 
elite, Assurbanipal set about restoring to power those princes Esarhaddon had 
originally relied on when he had conquered Egypt in 671 BCE.86 
These kings, prefects and governors, whom my father had installed in Egypt, 
who had deserted their posts before the advance of Tarku, (and) filled the plain, 
I reinstalled in their posts, in their (former) residences. ' 87 
Crossroads 
Syria-Palestine was the crossroads of the Ancient Near East and it represented a great 
'economic and political prize. Every northern and eastern power that arose in the 
ancient Near East tried to penetrate and occupy Syria' .88 From the early times of 
Egypt, to the Hittite presence in Anatolia and the Assyrians in Mesopotamia, Syria-
Levant had been a sought after territory. It is not to say, however, that these kingdoms 
were willing agents of foreign imperialism. The region was rife with rebellions, and 
an effective administration policy Was necessary for any outside power to maintain a 
stable hold over the territory. By the time that Esarhaddon ascended to the Assyrian 
throne on <?80 BCE, most of the western kingdoms bordering the Mediterranean had 
been conquered and re-organized into vassal states and provinces by Tiglath-Pileser 
III, Shalmaneser V, Sargon II and Sennacherib.89 Esarhaddon, and Assurbanipal had 
to maintain the successful Assyrian formula for administering Syria-Palestine so as to 
effectively tax the area and control trade. Keeping the local kingdoms in line was the 
first step to achieving this. 
85 Nicolas Grima!, A History of Ancient Egypt, (Oxford 2003), pp. 352. 
86 Kitchen (1986), Op Cit, pp. 145. 
87 ARAB IX: I: 771. Text from the Rassam Cylinder. Note the use of the word 'installed' as a clear 
indicator of heavy Assyrian interference in administering Egypt as a result of their foreign policy. This 
text also includes a list of rulers that Assurbanipal had installed in Egypt, providing an idea as to those 
installed by Esarhaddon a few years earlier. 
88 Knapp (1988), Op Cit, pp. 242. 
89 Marc van de Mieroop, A History of the Ancient Near East. Ca. 3000-323 BC. (Oxford 2005), pp. 
233-236. 
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The Master Seafarers 
The Phoenicians were a collection of small kingdoms spread out across the eastern 
Mediterranean seaboard, whose main economic lifeline was trade. Master seafarers' 
centuries before anyone else, the Phoenicians harboured a special place in the Ancient 
Near East: to control Phoenicia was to control the Mediterranean and one of the 
richest trade routes of the Ancient World. George Rawlinson claims that from the 12th 
century BCE 'the carrying trade of the world belonged mainly to Phcenicia, which 
communicated by land with the Persian Gulf, the Euphrates, Armenia, Cappadocia, 
and Anatolia, by sea with Egypt, Greece, Italy, North Africa, Gaul and Spain' .90 
Under Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal, in continuance of the predecessors' policies, the 
Phoenicians were given a limited form of independence: 'In order to force the 
redistribution of trade to Assyria, Assyrian foreign policy usually aimed at control 
over its trading partners; yet the Phoenicians remained virtually autonomous' .91 
Rather than relegate the Phoenician cities to provincial status, the Assyrians granted 
them a form of privileged vassal status.92 Carcemish, in South-Eastern Anatolia, was 
submitted to a similar treatment. Since it was the access point to the Anatolian metal 
trade for the Assyrian empire, the local elite was able to exercise a certain degree of 
independence. However, the Assyr~an army was always ready to move and quell any 
anti-Assyrian influence that might threaten its control over Carcemish.93 
Even so, .f.\ssyrian taxation on Phoenicia was not lenient, and the Assyrians 
maintained their own ports in the major Phoenician coastal cities to compete with 
the Phoenician ports. The Assyrians instituted a form of management known as 
karum, 'defined as the wharf or quay, Assyrian imperial trading colony, 
administrative centre, and the tax collecting station' .94 The karum enabled Assyria 
90 George Rawlinson, Phoenicia. History of a Civilization, (London, 2005), pp. 9. 
91 Knapp (1988), Op Cit, pp. 245. . 
92 Maria E. Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West: Politics, Colonies and Trade, (Cambridge, 2001), 
pp. 95. 
93 Susan Frankenstein, 'The Phoenicians in the Far West: A Function ofNeo-Assyrian Imperialism', in 
Mogens Larsen, Power and Propaganda. A Symposium on Ancient Empires. Mesopotamia. 
Copenhagen Studies in Assyriology Vol. VII, (Copenhagen, 1979), pp. 271-272. 
94 J. Lewy, (1956), On Som.e Institutions of the Old Assyrian Empire. Hebrew Union College Annual 
27, pp. 37-51. ' 
to keep the local elite in power and out of trouble, and it allowed them to maintain 
control over, and limit if necessary, trade that passed through Phoenician ports. 
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It cannot be said, though, that the Phoenicians were openly independent and able to 
undermine Assyrian rule. When in 676 BCE the Phoenician kingdom of Sidon 
rebelled against Assyria, Esarhaddon had no qualms about marching on the city and 
sacking it in true Assyrian fashion.95 
Abdi-milkutti, king of Sidon, who did not fear my majesty, did not heed the 
word of my lips, who trusted in the fearful sea and cast off my yoke, -Sidon, his 
garrison city, which lies in the midst of the sea ... Like a fish I caught him up 
out of the sea and cut off his head.96 
For allying with Egypt, Esarhaddon had the ruling elite beheaded for what was 
viewed as a grave act of insubordination.97 
The destruction of Sidon was a show of Assyrian force to discourage further 
rebellious behaviour by other Phoenician cities. Shortly afterwards a treaty with Ba'al 
of Tyre was accorded with Assyria, '[The treat]y of Esarhad[ don, king] of Assyria, 
son of [Sennacherib, likewise king of Assyria, with Baa]l, king ofTyre'.98 The treaty, 
rather lenient in terms, was probably a result of a willingness to submit to Assyrian 
overlordship on behalf of Tyre after Assyrian actions in Sidon. This somewhat 
effective way of controlling anti-Assyrian insurgencies was also used in Egypt in 
Memphis and Thebes. 
The treaty, where Esarhaddon agrees to entrust Tyre with the former lands of Sidon 
and respect the continuity of agreeable relations between Assyria and Tyre, proves the 
Assyrian inclination to use diplomacy where possible, although backed up with the 
very real threat of brutal retribution. Esarhaddon promises, in exchange for the 
acquiescence of Tyre to his rule, protection and respect of Tyre' s assets. 
95 Rallo and Simpson (1998), Op Cit, pp. 138. 
96 ARAB VII: I: 511. Extract from the historical texts ofEsarhaddon. 
97 Kuhrt (1995), Op Cit, pp. 516. 
98 ' SAA 2: 5. Parpola and Watanabe (1988). 
These are the ports of trade and the trade routes which Esarhaddon, king of 
Assyria, [entrusted] to his servant Baal. .. Nobody will [do] injustice [to those] 
who are hired [ ... ] and nobody will harm their ships'. 99 
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The destruction of Sidon and the treaty with Tyre beautifully contrast Assyrian 
foreign policy, be it unbridled military aggression or resorting to diplomacy. A treaty 
was no good unless an example could be made to convince other kingdoms that action 
against Assyria was not in their best option. 
When the Egyptian king Tirhaqa moved in on Assyrian interests in the Levant, Ba'al 
of Tyre betrayed the treaty that Esarhaddon had imposed on him, and obligingly sided 
with the Egyptians. Esarhaddon was only able to fortify the coast around Tyre and cut 
it off from the mainland, taking away most of its territorial holdings. As Assurbanipal 
marched on Egypt after Esarhaddon' s death, he stopped to accept the submission of 
Tyre back into Assyrian rule, as a result of the mainland blockade. 100 
During Assurbanipal's second campaign to Egypt in 664 BCE, Ba'al once more 
incurred Assyrian wrath by involving himself with the Egyptians, and after the 
complete conquest of Egypt by his forces, the Assyrian king focused his energies on 
the highly unreliable monarch. Although the Assyrian's did not have the naval 
capacity to completely besiege and capture Tyre, Assurbanipal was able to isolate 
them once again from the mainland. The Assyrians proceeded to conduct a limited 
form of siege warfare which payed off in the end. After overtures from Tyre, that 
included sending royal sons and daughters as hostages, the siege was lifted, and Ba'al 
was allowed to continue his vassalage to Assyria. 101 
In my third campaign I marched against Ba'li, king of Tyre, who dwells in the 
midst of the sea, when he did not observe my royal command and did not obey 
(lit., listen to, hear) the word of my lips. I threw up earthworks against him, by 
sea and land I seized his approaches (lit., ways). I pressed them sorely and made 
their lives miserable. I made them submit to my yoke. 102 
99 Ibid. Of course, the standard curse section follows. The curse sections of these treaties are what 
protect and bind the parties from the breaching of any of the clauses in the treaty. In any case, it is 
meant to protect Assyrian interests. 
100 Rawlinson, (2005), Op Cit, pp. 142. 
101 ARAB IX: I: 779. Text from the Rassam Cylinder. 
102 Ibid. . 
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Phoenicia's significant position in the international trade scene, a position made 
important both by its geographical location and navigational prowess, meant that it 
became increasingly important for the Assyrian empire, as it expanded in the Eighth 
and Ninth centuries, to control the Phoenician ports and trade networks. 103 It is 
possible that this was a method adopted by Assyria to restrict Egyptian access to 
international trade routes and deprive it from the enormous wealth flowing through 
the Phoenician networks. 
In spite of everything, Phoenicia was never comfortable under Assyrian overlordship, 
and, after countless participation in rebellions, Assurbanipal felt the need to turn such 
major cities, like Tyre in 640 BCE, into Assyrian provinces. Assyrian imperial policy 
in Phoenicia ended up damaging Phoenicia's Mediterranean interests, and by the time 
that the Assyrian empire fell, the Phoenicians were forced to compete with ever more 
powerful Greek states to control the Mediterranean trade routes, eventually losing 
t 104 ou. 
The Promised Land, and the Southern Levant 
Israel and Judah were an oddity in the Ancient Near East, a monotheistic society 
surrounded by polytheistic powers. War had separated the two bands of tribes that 
comprised the north and south, Israel and Judah respectively. Shalmaneser V laid 
waste to most of Israel during his reign, besieging the capital for three years, and 
leaving it to his successor, Sargon II, to convert it into the province of Samaria.105 
From the time of Sargon II, Israelite Samaria underwent a period of mass deportation 
and heavy taxation. The northern kingdom as an Israelite state ceased to exist. Instead 
it was populated with people belonging to the upper classes of Syria, Babylon, and 
later Arabia.106 In an act that was typically Assyrian as part of their religious 
imperialism policy, religious symbols from Israel were also removed. 107 Esarhaddon 
and Assurbanipal discontinued the policy of deportation that the other Sargonid kings 
103 Aubet, (2001), Op Cit, pp. 55. 
104 Roux (1992), Op Cit, pp. 336. 
105 Van de Mieroop (2005), Op Cit, pp. 235. 
106 B. S. J. Isserlin, The Israelites, (Minneapolis, 2001), pp. 86-88. For further reading into the 
deportation of foreign religious symbols by the Assyrians as a practice of religious imperialism and 
foreign policy, consult Hollpway (2002), Op Cit. 
107 Ibid. , 
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had carried out, 108 probably because there was not much left of the native population 
to deport. 
Judah was a different matter entirely. After Tiglath-Pileser III had rampaged along the 
Syrian coast, it had been incorporated into the empire as a vassal kingdom. 109 In 671 
BCE Sennacherib campaigned against Hezekiah, 110 the ruler of Judah, and laid siege 
to Jerusalem, though Judah was spared the fate that befell Israel. The Assyrians, 
content with the victory at Lac ish in the same year of the invasion and the seizure of 
large amounts of booty raised the siege on Jerusalem. The Judean king, now accepting 
Assyrian overlordship, reigned for another 15 years. 111 
Sennacherib's successors were much more content to follow a foreign policy line that 
was less belligerent, and were able to rely on the loyalty of Judah as a vassal 
kingdom, whose ruler seemed to realise that the Assyrian war apparatus was too much 
to deal with. Esarhaddon was able to launch his second invasion of Egypt, in 671 
BCE, with the support, or at the least the neutrality, of Judah.112 Assurbanipal claims 
that when he launches his first campaign against Egypt, Mannasseh of Judah offered 
the Assyrian armies safe passage, as well as gifts to the Assyrian king. 
In the course of my campaign ... Minse (Manasseh), king of Iaudi (Judah) ... in 
all 22 kings of the seacoast, of the midst of the sea and of the dry land, vassals 
of mine, brought their rich (lit., heavy) gifts [before me] and kissed my feet. 
Those kings], together with their forces .... 113 
Both Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal dealt with Mannasseh, and gave him a sort of 
favoured vassal status in the Levant, 114 though it was a change in Judean policy, not 
Assyrian, that allowed for this. After the Lacish siege, and the envelopment of 
Jerusalem by Sennacherib's forces, Hezekiah and his successor no doubt realised that 
108 Rallo and Simpson (1998), Op Cit, pp. 139. 
109 Van de Mieroop (2005), Op Cit, pp. 135. 
no Israel Finkelstein and Neil A. Silberman, The Bible Unearthed, (New York, 2001), pp. 259-264. 
111 Rallo and Simpson (1998), Op Cit, pp. 138. 
uz Ibid, pp. 138-139. 
113 ARAB: IX: III: 876. This inscription also mentions many other kings, loyal to Assyria, who 
provided aide and neutrality as Assurbanipal's armies marched on Egypt. 
14 Finkelstein and Silberman (2001), Op Cit, pp. 264-265. 
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with the Assyrian emp1re at its zenith, it was better to ally themselves to the 
Assyrians, rather than suffer the same fate as Israel. 
Assyria's policy in Judea, and much of Southern Palestine for that matter, had clear 
goals. Of the vassal states in the southernmost portion of Assyria's Levantine Empire, 
we can clearly distinguish Ekron, Ashdod, Askelon, Gaza and Judah lying in the 
buffer region between the Assyrian empire and the Egyptian kingdom.115 This region, 
including Judah, were not turned into provinces so that it could serve as a defensive 
zone against Egyptian military action. Since Judah was not a province and therefore 
not an extension of Assyria, Assyrian policy dealing with the vassal state falls under 
the category of foreign policy. 
It is remarkable the amount of foresight shown by the Assyrian kings in maintaining 
this system of buffer vassal states in southern Palestine. If this region had been turned 
into provinces an Egyptian invasion would have been an attack on an Assyrian 
province, and hence on Assyria proper, and dealt with great severity, but it would 
have also incurred losses on the garrison troops stationed in the area. It would have 
also been seen as a weakening of Assyrian power in its own provinces. By keeping 
the local elite in power and maintaining the system of vassal states, any Egyptian 
attack would be blunted before it hit the Assyrian provinces. Even in the case of the 
vassal state allying itself with Egypt, the pressure of the attack would have to be 
shouldered by that same state, so by the time it spilled over into the Assyrian 
provinces, the impact would have been reduced.116 
Buffer states serve important purposes in ancient times. A state that normally lay 
between two or more rival p6wers was normally tolerated or even encouraged by its 
powerful neighbours, since it could provide a limited form of security. 117 Judah, under 
Assyrian overlordship, was a buffer state against Egyptian actions in Palestine. Under 
this reasoning, we can understand why Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal were content to 
maintain the arrangement that Sennacherib had left behind after he had dealt with 
115 Refer to Map 3, Appendix 1. 
116 For an extended explanation of this tactic of using buffer states as a policy against Egyptian military 
action, refer to Benedikt Otzen (1979), 'Israel Under the Assyrians', in Larsen (1979), Op Cit, pp. 256-
258. 
117 Bradley J. Parker, The. Northern Frontier of Assyria as a Case Study in Imperial Dynamics, 
(Helsinki 2001 ), pp~ 251. 
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HezekiahY8 It was much more to Assyria's advantage to protect and maintain a 
foreign vassal, as long as taxes were paid, and have that same vassal blunt potential 
attacks by Egypt. 
118 ' ' Otzen (1979), Op Cit, pp. 258. 
Chapter 3 
Assyria and Babylonia 
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In the acoession year of Shamash-shum-ukin, in lyyar, Bel and the gods of Akkad came out of the 
city of Ashw; in lyyar on the 24111 they entered Babylon. 119 
It is hard to imagine undertaking a study of the Assyrian Empire without encountering 
Babylonia, especially during the Neo-Assyrian period. Babylonia commanded a 
special place in the Assyrian mindset. Assyrian culture had been richly influenced by 
Babylonia, as had its religion. This chapter highlights the closeness between these two 
great kingdoms of the Ancient World, and the fact that Babylonia was offered special 
treatment during the years that Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal were on the throne. The 
chapter will focus more on Esarhaddon's reign than Assurbanipal's since under 
Esarhaddon we find the most drastic reversal in Babylonian policy. Assurbanipal 
continues his father's policies up until the anti-Assyrian rebellion that started in 
Babylonia. 
The Babylonian Connection 
Assyria and Babylonia share a history so similar and intertwined that it would not be 
conceivable to undertake a detailed study of one without touching on the other. The 
fortunes of Babylonia at the hands of the resurgent Assyrians fluctuated violently. 
Under Sennacherib the city was besieged, conquered, sacked and levelled. In a great 
show of religious imperialism, the Assyrians removed the statue of Marduk, the chief 
deity of the city, leaving Babylon without its protector.120 However, Sennacherib's 
actions were by no means the norm. Up until the destruction of the city in 689 BCE at 
the hands of a victorious Assyrian army on the first day of the month Kislimu, 121 the 
Assyrian kings had treated the important Babylonian cities with respect. Sennacherib, 
hardened after so many years of war against the Babylonians and angered by the 
capture of his son and the subsequent delivery of the Assyrian prince to the Elamites, 
broke with this tradition. 122 
119 BM 86379. "A Chr~nicle of the Years B.C. 680-625" in Sidney Smith, Babylonian Historical Texts, 
(Hildesheim, 1975), pp. 25. 
120 Grant Frame, Babylonia 689-627 B.C. A Political History, (Leiden, 1992), pp. 52-53. 
121 Ibid, pp. 1. 
122 Ibid, pp. 69. 
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The two kingdoms shared several comparable features, such as a similar language, 
religion and cultural background. 123 By around 1510 BCE, Assyria's southern frontier 
with Babylonia was consolidated when a treaty between the two states was agreed 
upon. Another treaty between the two kingdoms was concluded just before 1400 
BCE. 124 Towards the end of the Second Millennium, as a result of the Amarna Age 
diplomatic system, 125 and Assyria's ability to free itself from the Mitanni yoke, the 
two states began an expanded period of direct contact that would last for over six 
centuries. As the Hittite presence in Southern Mesopotamia also waned, Assyrian 
intervention in Babylonia increased. 
It appears that during the early Amarna period, Assyria may have been politically 
dependent on Babylonia. In a piece of correspondence from the Amarna Letters 
cache, the Babylonian King, Burna-Buriash II, complains to the Pharaoh, Amenhotep 
IV, that 'his subjects' are being received without his permission by the Egyptian 
court.126 The subjects that the Babylonian ruler refers to are the Assyrians. 127 This 
may be why there is such heavy resistance to Assyrian rule in Babylonia: since they 
had once ruled the Assyrians, being conquered in turn by their onetime subjects was 
not a pleasant prospect. 
During Ashur-Uballit's reign, there is already heavy interference from Assyria in 
Babylonian internal affairs when the Assyrian monarch oversaw the removal of an 
anti-Assyrian king, instead replacing him with one whose sentiments towards Assyria 
were more amicable. 128 From the reign of Tukulti-Ninurta I (ca. 1243-1207) it is 
known that the Assyrians entered and sacked Babylon, including the removal of the 
Marduk statue from Babylon, thus presenting the Babylonians with their first taste of 
123 Amelie Kuhrt, 'Usurpation, Conquest and Ceremonial: From Babylon to Persia', in David 
Cannadine and Simon Price (Ed.), Rituals of Royalty. Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies, 
(Cambridge, 1987), pp. 28-29. 
124 John A. Brinkman (1972), 'Foreign Relations of Babylonia from 1600 to 625 B. C.: The 
Documentary Evidence', inAJA 76, No. 3 (July 1972), pp. 274-275. 
125 Discussed in Chapter 1. 
126EA 9. 
127 Ibid. See also Brinkman .(1972), Op Cit, pp. 275. 128 Brinkman (1972), Op Cit, pp. 276. 
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Assyrian rule. 129 It may have also presented Assyria with new perceptions on 
theology, and influenced Assyria's own pantheon of deities. With help from Assyria's 
perpetual enemy, the Elamite kingdoms in Iran, Babylon was able to affirm its 
domination over Assyria, placing a puppet king on the Assyrian throne in 1192 
BCE. 130 The next five centuries would be a continual struggle between Assyria and 
Babylonia, where more often than not Assyria would try to assert itself over its 
southern neighbour, and Babylonia would keep resisting and causing trouble. 
Esarhaddon and Babylonia 
Under Sennacherib's successor, Babylonia was to receive another drastic reversal in 
policy, a change as radical as the one it underwent under Sennacherib himself. 
Esarhaddon was 'simply returning to Assyria's normal policy towards Babylon up 
until Sennacherib's destruction of Babylon after the rebellion of 694-689'. 131 Shortly 
after ascending to the throne of Assyria, Esarhaddon set upon an ambitious plan to 
rebuild Babylon in a heartened attempt at reconciling the Babylonians to Assyrian 
overlordship. The single greatest threat to conciliation was the fact that the once great 
city of Babylon was in ruins. Esarhaddon, who had great respect for Babylonian 
scholarship and culture, was endeavouring to win Babylonian support with 
respectable actions and deeds. 132 
The physical reconstruction of Babylon was the first step in Esarhaddon' s 
reconciliation policy with Babylonia. It is important to note that Esarhaddon's actions 
toward Bal;>ylonia were unique in Assyrian imperial policy during his reign. No other 
victim of Assyrian conquest and destruction received the sort of attention toward 
reconstruction and resettlement as Babylon did. 133 This is where Assyrian imperial 
administrative policy, relating to Babylonia, contrasts so differently with Assyrian 
imperial policy in the West. Esarhaddon made it a clear objective of his time on the 
throne to rebuild Babylon: 
129 Joan Oates, Babylon. Revised Edition, (London, 1994), pp. 93-94. Also Brinkman (1972), Op Cit, 
pp. 276. 
130 Brinkman (1972), Op Cit, pp. 277. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. . 
133 It should be noted that it was not just the city of Babylon that received this special treatment, but 
rather several Babylonian cities, especially quite a few in Southern Babylonia, like Ur and Uruk. See 
Brinkman (1979) 'Babylonia Under the Assyrian Empire 745-627 BCE', in Larsen (1979), Op Cit, pp. 
223-250. Also Holloway (1992), Op Cit. 
Esagila, the temple of the gods, together with its shrines, Babylon the city under 
feudal protection, Imgur-Bel, its wall, Nimitti-Bel, is outer wall, from their 
foundations to their turrets, I built anew, I enlarged, I raised aloft, I made 
magnificent.134 
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The material rebuilding of Babylon was not the only issue to be resolved. 
Sennacherib, officially or ad hoc, had stripped the Babylonian citizenry of the civic 
rights that they were entitled to as privileged members of the monolithic Assyrian 
empire. Esarhaddon swiftly set about reinstating the favoured status that Babylon had 
enjoyed, thus attempting to win over support from Babylonia's ruling aristocracy.135 
This attempt wasn't solely restricted to the restoration of civic rights; it also espoused 
cultic patronage, 136 which meant the rebuilding and refurbishing of temples, and the 
restitution of divine statues and images. Esarhaddon stated: 
The images of the great gods I restored and had them replaced in their shrines to 
adorn them forever. Their offerings, which had ceased (to be brought), I re-
established. The sons of Babylon who had been brought to servitude ... I 
gathered together and accounted them for Babylonians. Their clientship I 
established anew. 137 
The question now arises as to why Esarhaddon was so devoted to the restoration of 
Babylon considering the endless amount of trouble it had caused Assyria in the past. 
It is known that Esarhaddon was a great admirer of Babylonian culture, and respected 
the deep r()ots that united both Assyria and Babylonia.138 Several Babylonian gods, 
Marduk above all, were important members of the Assyrian pantheon, and the long 
lasting Assyrian cultural dependence on Babylonia should also be noted. 
Losing Babylonia would have been unthinkable for Esarhaddon, as it would have 
been construed as a sign of Assyrian weakness by the other kingdoms, vassals and 
134 ARAB VIII: I: 646. Text from the 'Black Stone', relating to Esarhaddon's building inscriptions 
concerning the rebuilding of Babylon. Esagila was the temple dedicated to Marduk, patron deity of 
Babylon, that Sennacherib had gone to so much trouble to destroy. It is to be seen as a strong sign of 
religious patronage. 
1" . Holloway (2002), Op Cit, pp. 302. 
136 Ibid. 
137 ARAB VIII: I: 646. Text from the 'Black Stone', relating to Esarhaddon's building inscriptions 
concerning the rebuilding o.f Babylon. 
138 Frame (1992), Op Cit, pp. 69-71. 
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provinces under the administration of the great empire. 139 Babylonia was to Assyria's 
south, and the control of Babylonian territories allowed for a geographically important 
zone, between the southern fringes of the Assyrian empire and the Elamite kings, to 
be properly guarded. On the other hand, Babylonia had been a problem for many an 
Assyrian king, and it is likely that Esarhaddon, as a practical ruler, was trying to keep 
Babylonia 'quiet with the carrot instead of the stick' .140 Holloway offers the best 
explanation: 
Within the first year of his accession to the throne, Esarhaddon embarked on an 
ambitious, shrewd, and effective foreign policy aimed at Babylonian 
conciliation through high profile building works and a nuanced self-image 
propaganda initiative.141 
Whatever his reasons for paymg such preference to this form of imperial 
administration in Babylonia, it is clear that such a favoured position existed. The 
greatest indicator of this is the succession treaty that Esarhaddon had composed 
concerning his sons Assurbanipal and SamCiS-sumu-ukin, concluded in 672 BCE.142 
The treaty set out in precise details all the necessary information concerning his 
succession. What is most interesting about the treaty, which was enforced in front of 
representatives from all over the Assyrian empire, is that it deals specifically with the 
issue of Babylonia, and is a unique attempt by Esarhaddon to deal with the 'perennial 
Babylonian problem' .143 
In the past, more often than not, the Assyria Empire had been rocked by wars at the 
end of a king' s reign, and Babylonia, or Elamite opportunists utilising Babylonia as a 
platform, 144 had used the occasion to break away, seize territories and generally cause 
trouble. By establishing one son on the Assyrian throne, Assurbanipal, and the other 
on the Babylonian throne, SamCiS-sumu-ukin, Esarhaddon hoped to avert the chaos 
139 Frame (1992), Op Cit, pp. 69. 
140 Ibid, pp. 69. . 
141 Holloway (2002), Op Cit, pp. 77. 
142 Parpola and Watanabe (1988), Op Cit, pp. XIXX). 
143 Oppenheim (1977), Op Cit, pp. 169. 
144 Or even Chaldean tribes living in Babylonia's marshlands. One example is the tribe ofBit-Yakin, 
most famous for producing the Babylonian king Merodach-Baladan. 
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and disorder that regnal change usually brought to the Assyrian empire. This policy 
proved to be quite successful for the first 17 years of Assurbanipal' s reign. 145 
The important feature of this treaty is that the Assyrians installed a member of the 
royal family, an heir to be precise, on the throne of Babylonia in a serious attempt to 
bind Assyria and Babylonia into a pacific relationship. It explicitly implies a 
concerned attempt at maintaining a blood bond between Assyria and Babylonia. 
(This is) the treaty which Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, has concluded with you, 
in the presence of the great gods of heaven and earth, on behalf of Assurbanipal, 
the great crown prince designate, son of Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, your lord, 
whom he has named and appointed to the crown-princeship. 146 
When considering the level of success that Esarhaddon enjoyed, in respect to his 
Babylonian policy, during his lifetime, it is important to note the state of Assyro-
Babylonian affairs since the thirteenth century BCE. For the six centuries that passed 
until Tiglath-Pileser III takes the Babylonian throne, in the eighth century, 147 Assyria 
had been campaigning against Babylonia, both on the offensive and defensive. In no 
point is there acceptance of Assyrian rule in Babylonia, manifesting itself in countless 
rebellions, invasions and sackings. 
This issue reaches its climax during the rule of Sennacherib, and ends with the total 
destruction of Babylon. Esarhaddon has the choice to keep Babylon destroyed and 
weak, or rebuilding it. The short-term success that this policy enjoyed is demonstrated 
by the fact that for most of Esarhaddon' s reign, and 17 years after it, there is no major 
uprising recorded in Babylon.148 Yet the long-term consequence of this policy would 
be the destruction of the Assyrian empire following the death of Assurbanipal. 
145 Shortly after Esarhaddon's death, the queen dowager, Zakutu, imposed a loyalty pact on the 
Assyrian nation at large, including the royal family and ruling aristocracy. Esarhaddon's succession 
treaty and this loyalty pact helped maintain the internal stability of the empire until the Samas-sumu-
ukin rebellion. It is ironic that it was Assurbanipal's brother, the most prominent party of those held 
liable by the pact, who was to ultimately violate the terms of the contracting document. SAA 2: 8. 
Parpola and Watanabe, (1988). 
146 SAA 2: 6. From Esarhaddon's succession treaty. Parpola and Watanabe (1988). 
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Assurbanipal, Samas-sumu-ukin and Babylonia 
Due to Esarhaddon's prudent future planning concerning the issue of his succession, 
Assurbanipal's accession to the throne of Assyria, and SamaS-sumu-ukin to that of 
Babylonia, went relatively smoothly. Shortly after his accession, Assurbanipal set 
about completing his father's invasion ofEgypt. 149 He also claims that in keeping to 
his predecessor's policy in Babylonia, and no doubt fulfilling Esarhaddon's 
succession treaty, he installed Sam<lS-sumu-ukin onto the Babylonian throne to 
maintai~ Assyro-Babylonian unity: 'Shamash-shum-ukln, my full brother, I appointed 
to the kingship of Babylon' .150 Assurbanipal continued the rebuilding of Babylon, and 
kept to Esarhaddon's policy of patronage to the Babylonian cults, especially that of 
the chief deity of the city, Marduk. 151 During his reign he commissioned many new 
building projects in Babylon, continued the work on the Temple of Esagila, and 
established Babylon's privileged position within the empire. 152 
When Assurbanipal appointed Sam<lS-sumu-ukin to the throne of Babylonia, he 
allowed his brother to take the statue of Marduk back to the temple-complex of 
Esagila. 153 Even though Esarhaddon had decreed that the temple devoted to Marduk 
be rebuilt and replenished, he had not been able to complete the move of Marduk back 
to the city before he died, leaving the job up to his successors. As Assurbanipal 
explains: 
During my reign the great lord, Marduk, entered Babylon amid rejoicing, and in 
Esagila took up his eternal abode. The regular offerings of Esagila and the gods 
of Babylon I provided for. The feudal protection of Babylon I maintained, -that 
the strong may not injure the weak. 154 
149 Esarhaddon had died en route. See Chapter 2. 
150 ARAB XI: I:954. Text from the Babylonian-Borsippa Dedicatory Texts. 
151 ARAB XI: I. Op Cit. 
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This monumental event was important in winning Babylonian support for the new 
king and his Assyrian overlord.155 For twenty years Marduk had been absent from 
Babylon, and the important Ne~ Year's festival had not been performed. 156 There is 
little doubt that the sight of a new Babylonian king, returning with the statue of 
Marduk, would have been largely welcomed in Babylon after the 'kingless years' .157 
The power of imagery here highlights the importance that the Assyrian monarch 
attached to Babylonian affairs, and can be added to the already large list of actions 
undertaken during the years 680-627 BCE that demonstrate the unique position that 
Babylonia held within the Assyrian empire. 
There is no change here in Assurbanipal's attitude toward Babylonia since he 
followed his father's Babylonian policies. The fact that two siblings sat on the 
Assyrian and Babylonian thrones contributed to amicable relations between the two 
great kingdoms. Babylonia was able to enjoy a period of prosperity during the years 
680-627 BCE. The rebuilding of Babylon by Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal would 
eventually lead to that kingdom's ability to take over the administration of the empire 
created by the Neo-Assyrian kings after the fall of Assyria following the death of 
Assurbanipal. 
Like all Assyrian monarchs, Assurbanipal was reluctant to delegate authority, even to 
his own brother.158 Assurbanipal' s disinclination to entrust authority in his sibling, 
even in matters relating to Babylonia's internal affairs, came to be an acute 
problem. 15~ Even when Samas-sumu-ukin was technically the direct superior of the 
Babylonian provincial governors, these same governors were permitted to report 
directly to Assurbanipal, sidestepping the chain of command.160 Though Samas-sumu-
ukin was unhappy with what can only be viewed as the undermining of his authority, 
155 The fact that Samas-sumu-ukin also had to swear an oath of loyalty to Assurbanipal implies that he 
too was a subordinate to his brother, and that his rule was not independent of the Assyrian monarch. 
156 ABC: 31-33. Also Brinkman (1979), pp. 104-105. 
157 See Frame (1992), Op Cit, pp. 52-63. 
158 Frame (1992), Op Cit, pp. 107-110, 223. 
159 Ibid, pp. 223. 
160 Ibid. 
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an issue that he made clear to his brother/61 there is little he could have done to 
change the situation other than open rebellion.162 
Fifteen years into Assurbanipal's reign, Assyrian and Babylonian relations, partially 
due to Assurbanipal's incessant meddling in all things Babylonian, were put under 
stress. In an attempt to show that Babylonia was still favoured by Assyria, 
Assurbanipal had the ceremonial bed of Marduk returned to Babylon in 654.163 
Nevertheless, when rebellion broke out in 652 BCE, Assurbanipal was ruthless in 
putting down the anti-Assyrian coalition. After four years of warfare, Assyrian troops 
once again victoriously entered Baby Ion after a protracted siege of the city. 164 
This time the victory was bittersweet. Assyria's enemies had been decisively 
defeated, but four years of civil war had exhausted the power of the Assyrian armies, 
depleted her treasury, and once again Babylonia was the centre of Assyrian problems. 
Even so, part of the reason that the anti-Assyrian coalition was unable to defeat the 
armies of Assyria, aside from the brute might of the Assyrian armed forces, was the 
fact that they were unable to garner total support. What is more, many Babylonian 
cities opted to co-operate with Assyria, in a clear indication of the short-term success 
of Assyria's imperial policy in Babylonia. After the Samas-sumu-ukin rebellion, there 
exist no records of any major military campaigns undertaken by the Assyrians, even 
though the empire was to last for another three decades. 165 
Imperial .Policy in Babylonia: Civil or Foreign? 
The case for the classification of imperial administration in Babylonia is difficult due 
to its unique position within the Assyrian empire. A case can be argued for the term 
'civil' to be used when referring to what sort of policy was applied to Babylonia. 
Cultural and lingual proximity support this argument. Assurbanipal' s brother sat on 
the throne of Babylonia, and that by receiving such privileged rights under the 
161 ABL 426. A letter from SamliS-sumu-ukin to his brother requesting that he be able to deal with his 
own subordinates. 
162 Which eventually did happen when SamliS-sumu-ukin headed a powerful anti-Assyrian coalition 
against his brother. Assurbanipal's constant meddling in Babylonian affairs may have contributed to 
SamliS-sumu-ukin's ill feelings to the Assyrian king. See Frame (1992), Op Cit, pp. 223. 
163 Frame (1992), Op Cit, pp. 129. The ceremonial bed was taken during Sennacherib's campaign and it 
became the ceremonial bed used by Assur. 
164 Oppenheim (1977), Op C:it, pp. 169-170. 
165 Brinkman (1979), Op Cit, pp. 233. 
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Assyrians, Babylonia cannot be considered a vassal state, but more likely an extension 
of the Assyrian heartland. Also, when Assyria went to war, it was two brothers at the 
helms of opposing armies. Two brothers going to war against each other would argue 
the case for the term 'civil war' when referring to the Babylonian rebellion.166 
Another line of reasoning can be found in the willingness of the Assyrian king to 
assume the kingship of Babylonia, as was the case for Esarhaddon. 
The style of administration in Babylonia was also different to the extent that 
Assurbanipal was concerned, and willing to meddle, with the state of Babylonian 
internal affairs. No other kingdom of the Assyrian empire receives such a treatment 
bordering on micro-management. 167 The depth of Assyrian control on Babylonian 
internal affairs is reminiscent of Assyrian provincial administration, and a province is 
considered to be an extension of Assyria proper. 
Two other factors contribute to the idea of 'civil' policy: the civic rights reinstated by 
Esarhaddon, and the freedom from taxation on Babylonia's religious centres. 
Esarhaddon offers the peoples of Babylon civic rights similar to those held by native 
Assyrians, in a calculated move to benefit from Babylonian goodwill. Freedom from 
taxation was a benefit enjoyed by those living in Assyrian religious, but not 
administrative, centres. When Esarhaddon offered the city of Babylon similar civic 
rights to those available to native Assyrians, freedom from taxation for cult centres, in 
particular the city ofBabylon, was also implied.168 
Chapter 4 
166 In fact several authors on the subject of Assyrian history have labelled it a 'civil war', most notably 
Oppenheim, (1977), pp. 169. 
167 Frame (1992), Op Cit, pp. 131. 
168 ' Ibid, pp. 75. 
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Comparison: Differences and Similarities? 
'Who under the protection of Assur, ·Sin, Samash, Nau, Marduk, Ishtar of Nineveh /star if Arbela, 
the great gods his lords, made his way from the l'ising to the setting sun, having no rb'a1 169 
The preceding chapters have provided an account of Assyrian imperial administration 
policies in several areas of its empire, under the kings Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal. 
This chapter will exclusively aim at highlighting the main differences in Assyrian 
policy towards its western empire, and that used in its administration of Babylonia. 
The differences in Assyrian imperial policy make us question the Assyrian reasoning 
behind their choices. Assyrian theology demanded its warrior kings to carve out a 
great empire and imitate the rule of Assur and the other Assyrian gods in the heavens. 
Conquest, devastation and merciless destruction, though never wanton, were 
necessary to expand Assyria's empire into the Levantine states, especially to protect 
its interests against attacks and advances from the other world power, Egypt. 
Why were Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal so different in their manner of conduct in 
Babylonia as compared to the west? Would it not have been easier to leave it 
destroyed and unpopulated, an empty buffer state unable to create any sort of 
significant rebellion that would have threatened Assyrian sovereignty? Was 
conciliation applicable to Babylonia only? 
Difference,s: The Bureaucratic Structure 
Babylonia sustained a favoured position m the planning of Assyrian imperial 
administration in the conquered territories, a fact that is quite blatant for all to see. 
The most important indicator to this is the installation of an Assyrian prince on the 
Babylonian throne, a royal heir to be precise, and the elder sibling of the crown 
prince. Esarhaddon was no fool, he was trying to pre-empt future Babylonian 
insurgencies by installing two brothers on the thrones of Assyria and Babylonia and 
using that as a platform for conciliation. 
169 ARAB VII: II: 527. 
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Nowhere in Assyria's western empire do we see a member of the Assyrian royal 
family sent off to directly rule over a province or vassal state. The installation of 
Samas-sumu-ukin on the Babylonian throne was unique. Esarhaddon was able to not 
only end Babylon's 'kingless' years but also find in Assurbanipal a suitable heir, 
willing to carry out his wishes for Babylonia. Assurbanipal, fulfilling his father's 
testament, sets his elder brother upon the throne of Babylonia, and allows for the 
statue of Marduk to be returned. These acts of patronage by the Assyrian kings are 
visible only in Babylonia. There are no known records to this date that illustrate any 
sort of Assyrian attempt at restoring destroyed kingdoms in Egypt or the Levant. 
The level of management of Babylonian internal affairs, including economic, military 
and administrative dealings, by the Assyrian king is not mirrored elsewhere in the 
empire. In Egypt and Judah the level of control is quite superficial, limited mainly to 
the selection of local rulers in the Egyptian case. The situation in Tyre is similar 
excluding the appointment, as part of the treaty between Ba' al and Esarhaddon, 170 of 
Assyrian representatives to help the king of Tyre in matters relating to the Phoenician 
ports, undermining Ba'al's authority in port affairs. 171 It is an indicator as to who 
wielded the real power in Babylonia. The answer in this case is Assurbanipal since 
Samas-sumu-ukin had no military forces under his control, and it was Assurbanipal 
who held the final authority in all things concerning Babylonian foreign and internal 
affairs and defence.172 
In Egypt, Esarhaddon ruled the kingdom by way of utilising the local elite as a means 
of control. Rather than abolishing the effective administrative structure the Egyptians 
had in place, Esarhaddon was able to apply a formula successfully proven in the other 
corners of his empire. Without sending a member of the Assyrian royal family, 
Esarhaddon installed into offices several members of the local elite, who pledged their 
loyalty to Assyria: 
Over all of Egypt I appointed anew kings, viceroys, governors, commandants, 
overseers and scribes. Offerings and dues I established for Assur and the great 
170 SAA 2: 5. Parpola and Watanabe (1988). 
171 Aubet, (2001), Op Cit, pp. 59. 
172 Frame (1992), Op Cit, 113-114. 
gods for all time, my royal tribute and tax, yearly without ceasing, I imposed 
upon them.173 
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Esarhaddon was able to install local kings into power and was willing to promise 
them assistance if their position was challenged as long as the taxes flowed into 
Assyrian coffers, and trade was exploited by merchants loyal to Assyria. Assurbanipal 
was able to offer that same protection. When re-conquering the kingdom in 664-663 
BCE he re-installed the original rulers that his father had put in place. 
In Judah the different situation was dealt with accordingly. Since Sennacherib had 
already inflicted severe punishment on the Israelite kingdoms, including the ruin of 
Israel, the kings Hezekiah and Mannasseh of Judah were willing ally themselves with 
Assyria. They readily accepted Assyrian overlordship to protect their land against 
further ravages. There was no need to meddle with the local ruling structure, so 
Assyria left it largely unchanged, preferring this vassal kingdom to remain nominally 
independent, and continue to function in the role of buffer state. 
In Phoenicia, no doubt both Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal would have liked to have 
made some changes in the ruling structure of Tyre. When Sidon fell, Esarhaddon 
entrusted those lands that once belonged to the city into the hands of Ba' al of Tyre. 
Ba' al was quick to forget his loyalty to the man who had installed him on the throne 
of Tyre, and was a participant in several insurrections that troubled the Assyrians in 
the Levant. Unfortunately for both Assyrian rulers, the island fortress was beyond 
conquering by their armies. Ba' al of Tyre was able to get away with many an 
indiscretion due to the geographical situation of his city. He was able to maintain his 
position as king of Tyre by quick political manoeuvring, and offering peace 
settlements. Had Tyre been on the mainland it is conceivable that the city would have 
suffered a similar fate to that which befell Sidon. 
The Assyrian kings were content to allow the local kings to remain on the throne; they 
did not need the upheaval that usually followed the downfall of a king in the ancient 
world. Assyrian ideology meant they had to go out and conquer an empire for their 
gods, but not impose their religion on other cultures, or depose the kings that upheld 
173 ARAB VII: IV: 580. 
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them. Acts of religious imperialism are only present when a king has 'sinned' against 
the Assyrians, 174 and can no longer offer his gods, nor the Assyrian gods, the 
protection and respect they so rlghtly deserve.175 
Differences: Destruction, Rebuilding, and the Power of Imagery 
The destruction of Babylon at the hands of Sennacherib was by no means the normal 
manner for the Assyrian's to deal with Babylonia. Esarhaddon, by rebuilding 
Babylon, was reverting to the more common practice of not destroying Babylon after 
each war against it, and offering royal patronage to the city so important to Assyrian 
culture. The rebuilding of Babylon would have come at a steep cost. Esarhaddon 
spared no expenses to ensure Babylon once again became a proud and powerful 
city. 176 Assurbanipal did much the same. 
In direct contrast, no effort was spared to reduce Memphis and Thebes in Egypt, and 
Sidon in Phoenicia, to rubble for grave acts of insubordination and dissent, nor are 
there any inscriptions that deal with an attempt by the Assyrian monarchs to rebuild 
these cities. Sidon's destruction was a warning to the other Phoenician cities to not 
entertain fantasies about direct disobedience against Assyria. The sacking of Memphis 
by Esarhaddon' s armies served the same purpose, and it would have been a powerful 
admonition toward the pharaoh, Tirhaqa, to not come back. Though it was standard 
practice of the victorious army to loot and sack a city, these actions were no doubt 
useful propaganda for the Assyrian kings, and they would proudly boast of their 
vengeful nature. On the conquest of Memphis, Esarhaddon wrote, 'Memphis, his 
royal city, in half a day, with mines, tunnels, assaults, I besieged, I captured, I 
destroyed, I devastated, I burned with fire' .177 
The power of imagery in the Assyrian management of their empire is not to be taken 
lightly. Two examples can be looked at to highlight the differences found in image 
174 As in failed to pay taxes or tribute. 
175 R. J. van der Spek (1993), 'Assyriology and History. A Comparative Study of War and Empire in 
Assyria, Athens and Rome', in Mark E. Cohen, Daniel Snell and David Weisberg (Ed.), The Tablet and 
the Scroll. Near Eastern Studies in Honor of William W. Halla, (Maryland 1993), pp. 264. 
176 In ARAB, we find the text from Prism number 78,223, housed at the British Museum, in which 
Esarhaddon lists materials used to rebuild Babylon and Esagila. These materials include lapis lazuli, 
gold, silver, marble and cedar, all very expensive. ARAB VIII: I: 648-657. 
T77 ARAB VII: IV: S80. 
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representation in Babylonia, versus that found in the western portion of the Assyrian 
empire.178 The first one is the Zinjirli stele, set up in Northern Syria, in which we find 
a triumphant Esarhaddon, a cup for pouring libations to the gods in one hand, and a 
mace in the other. Kneeling at his feet are Tirhaqa of Egypt and Ba'al of Tyre, both 
leashed to a rope that is held by Esarhaddon. What this image is meant to portray is 
not in discussion, what is surprising is the aggressiveness of it, no doubt used to 
impress upon the western states the omnipotence of Assyrian imperial power. 
The second image is much different, and it is one from the time of Assurbanipal. It 
shows the Assyrian king actively engaging in rebuilding activities in Babylon. In this 
image, Assurbanipal is carrying the weight of a basket laden with building materials 
upon his shoulders. This is an attempt to cast the Assyrian king in a positive image, 
that of benevolent overlord, actively contributing to Babylon's reconstruction. 
Though both the Zinjirli stele and the image of Assurbanipal are similar in the fact 
that they serve to represent an image of the king as supreme ruler, the way they go 
about doing so is much different. One instils fear and awe, the other respect and 
admiration. 
Differences: Social and Religious 
The return of the Marduk statue by Assurbanipal, in the hands of Sama§-sumu-ukin, is 
a powerful public display of cultic patronage, a culmination of the hard work 
undertaken by Esarhaddon to try to appease Babylonian sentiments. Esarhaddon had 
begun the, rebuilding of the Esagila temple complex, which Assurbanipal would 
continue after his father's death. It was not Assyrian policy, nor part of their religious 
ideology, to convert lands that they had conquered to the Assyrian faith. Whilst 
religious imperialism was a standard practice to morally weaken the enemy, and 
punish a city for resisting Assyrian rule, it was not fed by a desire to proselytise. We 
find no other case of religious patronage similar to what happened in Babylon, and 
some of the other important Babylonian cities, like Ur and Uruk. 
When Esarhaddon decides to rebuild Babylon, it is obvious that the displaced 
population must be allowed to return to their city. A reversal of the Assyrian 
178 An example of both images can be found in Appendix 2. 
54 
deportation policy is effected. Contrasting Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal' s actions in 
Egypt, the original inhabitants of Babylon are allowed to return from forced exile. Not 
only that, but the Assyrian kings decide to restore full civic rights back to the 
population of the city of Babylon. Rights similar to those enjoyed by the Assyrian 
population in the core Assyrian cities. Where else in the Assyrian empire is another 
example of civic patronage available? The answer, to put it simply, is nowhere. It was 
exclusive to Babylonia. 
Why? 
The questions that arise to this variation in policy are difficult to answer. It is clear 
that a special relationship existed between Assyria and Babylonia, and that 
Esarhaddon held great respect for Babylonian culture, and that Assurbanipal respected 
his father's ambitions. Assyrian ideology stated that it was their divine duty, as 
entrusted to them by the gods, to go out and conquer lands in the name of Assur. 
Conquering those kingdoms that composed its western empire fulfilled this divine 
duty. These were distant lands composed of foreign peoples, with different ideologies 
and cultural backgrounds. To ravage these lands not only weakened the enemies of 
the empire, but it served to bring in many riches, and satisfy the belligerent gods of 
the Assyrian pantheon, 'the Assyrian domination is sanctioned by the gods, and thus 
opposition to the subjugation is sin' .179 
There is also the idea that conquest is not just advantageous because of the immediate 
material agvantage, 180 but it also serves t~ legitimise a ruler's position on the 
throne.181 This is especially the case for the Assyrian warrior kings. Conquering the 
western states through force, rather than persuasion, was always an acceptable option 
for the Assyrian kings, who used war to justify their position as executor of Assur' s 
will on earth. 
The long and complex history that Assyria shared with Babylonia made this idea of 
conquest through force less palpable, though not totally undesirable. 182 Both 
179 Vander Spek (1993), Op Cit, pp. 265. 
180 Ibid, pp. 270. The material advantage is that encompassed by the traditional looting of war booty. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Many times in their complex relationship Assyria had turned its armies on Babylon as a result of 
rebellion, or direct attack. 
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Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal, though ruthless leaders when the situation deemed it 
necessary, were learned leaders, and held respect for Babylonian culture, religion and 
academia. It was also clear that many of Assyria's traditions, and some of its gods, 
were directly influenced by Babylonia. How were these kings to justify an aggressive 
move against a people so similar to their own? War with Babylonia was 'hampered by 
extra susceptibilities, and needed extra ideological foundation' .183 Esarhaddon 
preferred not to, and instead was willing to conquer Babylonia via diplomacy. His 
rebuilding of the city, the re-instatement of their civil rights and his cultural patronage 
of the city were just as effective in maintaining Babylonia pacified as having a large 
army camped outside ready to enter the city at the first hint of rebellion, leaving these 
armies free to be concentrated elsewhere.184 
Another reason for the material rebuilding of Babylon is similar to the reason attached 
to the Assyrian preservation of the vassal state system in the southern Levant. The 
Elamite kingdoms, in modern day Iran, were forever causing the Assyrians grief by, 
more often than not, instigating rebellions against Assyria in Babylonia. To have a 
strong Babylonian ally, loyal and united under the Assyrian cause, it could act in a 
role similar to a buffer state against Elam, and serve as a safe platform to launch 
future campaigns eastwards. Though Assyria was much more involved in Babylonian 
internal affairs than in its vassal buffer states, to maintain a strong Assyrian presence 
that was positively viewed and actively accepted Babylonia, may have been a 
deterrent against Elamite machinations. 
Assurbanipal continues on the work started by his father through more cultural 
patronage, including the rebuilding of the Esagila temple complex, and allowing the 
Marduk statue to be returned when his brother ascends to the Babylonian throne. He 
also continues his predecessor's policy of materially rebuilding the city. Assurbanipal 
is forced into war against Babylonia because an anti-Assyrian coalition, at the head of 
which is his own brother, openly declares its intentions. The Assyrians, not willing to 
show any weakness, crush the rebellion in four years, and once again march into 
Babylon. This was not to be the final chapter in the relationship between Assyria and 
Babylonia. 
183 Vander Spek n993), Op Cit, pp. 267. 
184 Frame (1992), Op Cit, pp. 71. 
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Conclusion 
They marched along the back of th~ Tigris. {. .. they encamp]ed against Nineveh From the month 
§ivan until the month Ab-for three [months- .. J ... they subjected the city to a heavy siege. 185 
Even though the Assyrians practiced differing imperial policies in different parts of its 
empire, the empire collapsed by overextending itself and incorporating too many 
foreign elements into its army. In 640 BCE Assyria held in its grip the four corners of 
the Ancient World. By 612 BCE, Nineveh, the administrative capital of the empire, 
had fallen to the Medes. In less than three decades, it would lay in ruins, forever 
consigned to history, and never to rise again. 
Through the employment of many techniques, the Assyrian empire was able to amass 
an expanse of territory so large that much of the civilized world was under its thumb. 
The Assyrian warrior kings were able to assemble colossal armies, and convert them 
into a force so formidable, so well trained, and so advanced in weaponry and strategy, 
that they were able to conquer all who opposed them. These cunning kings did not 
just rely on military muscle to build their empire however; they employed other 
methods, such as the imposition of treaties and non-aggression pacts. They found that 
it was almost as useful to employ diplomatic methods into their experiment in empire 
building, and more often than not it proved to be more cost effective than marching an 
army to level a city. That said, it must not be forgotten that the Assyrians only looked 
out for the.mselves and any treaty or pact was backed up by a very real threat of 
violent action. 
Maintaining and effectively running an empire is just as important as conquering it, 
and for this purpose the resourceful Assyrians employed different policies for 
imperial administration. From 680 to 627 BCE, when their empire was at its hubris, 
the kings Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal employed dissimilar administrative policies in 
different parts of their empire. 
185 ABC, Chronicl~ 3. Detailing the fall ofNineveh. 
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The first Near Eastern power to conquer Egypt, the Assyrian experience in this rich 
land was new, but they managed to apply a policy that had been proved in other parts 
of their empire. The manipulation of the local elite meant that Assyria was able to 
effectively use the governing structure in place, appointing kings or rulers loyal to the 
Assyrian cause, offering protection to the local elite should they come under foreign 
invasion, or see their position of power challenged by local elements. It was a useful 
foreign policy for dealing with a land so far from its own. One could argue that they 
were pioneers in the art of what is now known as diplomacy and international 
relations. 
In Phoenicia, the situation was different due to a geographical reason. Though Sidon 
had been razed for resisting Assyrian imperialism, Ba' al of Tyre was able to get away 
with many insubordinate acts due to Tyre's position as an island fortress, one that the 
powerful Assyrian army was unable to reach. Had Tyre been part of the mainland, it 
is probable that the Assyrian army would have repeated what they had done with 
Sidon. It was a mixture of diplomacy and military action that kept Tyre pacified and 
paying its share of tribute, until Assurbanipal had it converted into another province. 
Ba' al, although quite disloyal at times, was a local ruler installed by Esarhaddon, and 
maintained by Assurbanipal. As was the case with Egypt, a local ruler was used by 
the Assyrians to manage Tyre's territories. 
In Judah we once again see a different situation. Both Hezekiah and Mannasseh were 
willing to ,accept Assyrian overlordship, fearful of suffering a fate similar to that of 
Israel before it was turned into the Assyrian province of Samaria. The destruction of 
Israel, and the deportation of its population proved to be a powerful warning to Judah 
to not entertain hopes of rebellion. They maintained their neutrality as Esarhaddon 
and Assurbanipal campaigned in Egypt, and the two Assyrian rulers were willing to 
let this important buffer state maintain nominal independence. The Assyrian policy in 
Judah, and some other southern Levantine kingdoms, can be considered a foreign 
policy aimed at effective defence. Measures taken to ensure these states were kept as 
vassal buffer kingdoms, meaning that they were Assyria's first line of defence should 
a powerful force attack the Assyrian empire through the Levant. 
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On the other hand, the imperial administration policy that Assyria adopted in 
Babylonia could not have been more unlike. Esarhaddon sought to rebuild Babylon 
after its destruction at the hands of Sennacherib, and, for many reason, he was willing 
to pay Babylon serious patronage in all areas. The city was rebuilt at great cost to the 
Assyrian treasury and even the Esagila temple complex was restored. The civic rights 
of Babylon were re-instated, and a serious attempt at reconciling the two 
neighbouring kingdoms was made when Esarhaddon placed two of his sons, 
Assurbanipal and Sama.S-sumu-ukin, on the thrones of Assyria and Babylon 
respectively. 
Assurbanipal was thrust upon the Assyrian throne to continue his father's policy of 
appeasement in Babylonia. He continued public works, and when he had his brother 
installed on the throne of Babylonia, he made sure the statue of Marduk was returned. 
Kidnapped by Sennacherib in an act of religious imperialism, the return of Marduk 
enabled the proud Babylonians to enact their New Year's festival, and once again 
enjoy the protection oftheir city's chief deity. 
Furthermore, the use of positive imagery by the Assyrian kings in Babylonia fostered 
the idea that they were benevolent rulers with Babylonia's best interests at heart. This 
research corroborated that this contrasted with the sort of imagery found concerning 
Assyria's management of the western portion of its empire. Here, the Assyrian kings 
portrayed themselves as vengeful rulers, ready to bring hardships onto those who 
opposed Assyrian rule. The Zinjirli Stele, found in Syria, is a perfect example. 
Unusually aggressive in its presentation, it showcased Esarhaddon as a powerful 
overlord, willing to resort to violence to maintain the stability of his empire. It is in 
stark contrast to the image of a benevolent Assurbanipal actively contributing to the 
rebuilding ofBabylon. 
The reasons for such an abrupt change in policy are many. The Assyrian pantheon 
included Assyrian gods, and Marduk was an important deity for the Assyrians. 
Babylonia and Assyria also shared a long, rich and deeply intertwined history. Since 
the end of the 16th century BCE they had been in a state of constant contact. Many 
times during their long history, one would dominate another, and assimilation of 
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culture, religion, bureaucracy and language was possible, thus by the time Esarhaddon 
took power, there were many similarities. It is quite reasonable to believe that the 
Assyrians were unable to apply, or at least justify, such a belligerent policy with a 
culture so similar to their own. 
At the same time, Assyrian kings used conquest, in the name of Assur, as a means to 
legitimise their reigns. In the name of the Assyrian gods they were meant to subjugate 
all those who challenged Assyrian attempts at re-enacting the established cosmic 
order. Whilst Babylonia, as previously discussed, created a problem, the Levantine 
states and Egypt did not. Undoubtedly, the destruction of Thebes, Memphis and Sidon 
served as warning to those who harboured rebellious attitudes toward their Assyrian 
overlords. 
Finally, this research confirmed that even though by the mid 71h century BCE, 'the 
enemies of Assyria lay prostrate, conquered and devastated, the demise of the 
Assyrian empire was not to be avoided. Like an ageing star, the Assyrian empire had 
grown to untold size and magnificence, and imploded as a result of over extension. 
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The Zinjirli Stele, found in the Vorderasiatisches Museum, Berlin (VA 2708). 
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